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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters in empirical microeconomics. The first two
chapters apply machine learning tools to labor market discrimination in professional
basketball and demographic sorting in American politics. The third chapter examines
the effect of charter school attendance on subsequent student mobility.
In the first chapter, I analyze whether conformity to racial stereotypes is rewarded
or penalized in the labor market for first-year players in the National Basketball As-
sociation. Given anecdotal evidence of racial stereotypes about the playing style and
characteristics of white and black basketball players, I test the hypothesis that these
stereotypes, and specifically whether a player conforms to the relevant stereotypes
for his race, may have an effect on the outcome of the NBA draft, where incoming
players are assigned to NBA teams. I apply a random forest model to analyze players’
relative conformity to racial stereotypes and a conditional logit model to test whether
there are observable effects on team assignments. I find that players who conform to
their racial stereotype are positively rewarded, with much of the effect concentrated
in more recent draft cohorts and along the extensive margin.
v
In the second chapter (joint with James Feigenbaum), we use a machine approach
to test the hypothesis that post-1950s American political polarization has taken the
form of increasing sorting along demographic cleavages. We find that while the predic-
tive power of Americans’ demographic profiles for the political camps was relatively
stable from 1952 through the mid-2000s, it has subsequently intensified. We also use
our model to confirm prior findings that racial resentment has become an increasingly
important predictor of political sorting.
In the third chapter (joint with Marcus Winters), we study the causal effect of
charter school attendance on subsequent student mobility under a common enrollment
system for charter and traditional public schools in Newark, New Jersey. Exploiting
information from the deferred acceptance assignment mechanism and applying a novel
correction for the proportion of mobility attributable to differences in assigned stu-
dents’ preferences, we find that charter school attendance leads to significantly less
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Racial Discrepancies in Labor Outcomes:
Evidence From White Men Jumping
1.1 Introduction
Stereotypes, and in particular racial stereotypes, abound in many settings.1 For
example, when asked if Black people are generally lazy, approximately 27% respond
affirmatively compared to approximately 12% when asked the same about White
people. Conversely, only 22% agree that Black people are generally hard-working,
compared to 37% for White people.2 Stereotypes can also exist in more objectively
verifiable domains. For example, when asked to estimate the height of Black and
White young men after viewing photographs of their faces, White survey respondents
estimated that Black individuals were taller than White individuals by a statistically
significant margin. This is despite the fact that among the young men in question,
the White individuals were slightly taller, a fact that is also true in the general
population.3
1While discussions concerning stereotypes frequently are centered around pejorative and/or false
views of groups, neither of these necessarily need be the case. This paper will follow the definition
given in Oxford English Dictionary : “A widely held but fixed and oversimplified image or idea of a
particular type of person or thing.”
2This results comes from the 2016 General Social Survey. Respondents are asked to rank groups
on a 1-7 scale, where 1 indicates that the group is near-universally “hardworking” and 7 near-
universally “lazy.” An answer of 4 corresponds to agreeing that “the group is not towards one end
or another.”
3See Wilson et al. (2017). The young men in question were high school football players, but this
fact was not revealed to the study participants. Interestingly, the players’ actual height was not a
statistically significant predictor of the respondents’ estimates based on facial photos.
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I investigate whether racial stereotypes, and particularly whether an individual
conforms to the stereotypes concerning his race, affect labor market returns. This
may hold true if, for example, employers are more likely to identify and reward char-
acteristics or skills that match their prior expectations for a potential employee.4
I analyze this hypothesis by looking at a very peculiar setting: the labor market
for incoming first-year players in the National Basketball Association (hereafter, the
NBA). Anecdotal evidence from players indicates that they believe there to be perva-
sive stereotypes within the basketball community about the particular characteristics
and play styles associated with White and Black players. I employ an approach from
machine learning, random forests, to analyze the degree to which potential first-year
players do or do not conform to the characteristics typical of players of their race,
and then use a conditional logit model to test whether this degree of conformity has
an impact on whether they are chosen earlier (or at all) in the draft held for incoming
players.5 I find that players with characteristics more typical for players of their race
(i.e., those who more closely conform to racial stereotypes) are positively rewarded
in the draft, with the effect concentrated in more recent draft cohorts and along the
extensive margin of whether players are selected rather than the intensive margin of
draft position.
1.1.1 Racial Stereotypes in the National Basketball Association
Speaking after a 1987 playoff defeat by the rival Boston Celtics and their White star
Larry Bird, Detroit Pistons Hall of Fame point guard Isiah Thomas said that Bird
was only considered to be one of the league’s best players on the basis of his race.
While he later said that his comments were meant partially in jest and as hyperbole,
4Theoretically, the opposite could also hold true: a characteristic or skill that does not match
prior expectations could attract more notice due to it being surprising.
5As detailed in Section 3, earlier slots in the selection order are better compensated and often
lead to larger on-court roles, so it is generally seen as preferable to be drafted earlier.
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Thomas clarified that he believes stereotypes led to different perceptions of Black and
White players:
What I was referring to was not so much Larry Bird, but the perpetu-
ation of stereotypes about Blacks. When Bird makes a great play, it’s due
to his thinking, and his work habits. It’s all planned out by him. It’s not
the case for Blacks. All we do is run and jump. We never practice or give
a thought to how we play. It’s like I came dribbling out of my mother’s
womb. You hear it on television, you see it in the papers. I remember
watching the NCAA. finals between Syracuse and Indiana. I listened to
Billy Packer [a White television announcer], who I like, and who I think
likes me, and he said when Indiana was sending in Garrett and Smart,
“Well, here come the athletes into the game.” The word “athletes.” I
think that that’s an unconscious statement concerning race. I don’t like
it. [Black NBA stars such as] Magic and Michael Jordan and me, we’re
playing on God-given talent, like we’re animals-lions, and tigers who run
around wild in a jungle, while Larry’s success is due to intelligence and
hard work. Blacks have been fighting that stereotype about playing on
pure instinct for so long, and basically it still exists - regardless of whether
people want to believe it or not.(Berkow 1987)
Thomas was not alone in believing that racial stereotypes affect how players are
viewed, and this belief has persisted over time. Almost three decades later, Memphis
Grizzlies forward Chandler Parson put forward a similar claim when asked about the
experience of being a White player in the NBA:
Being White in the NBA, there are a lot of stereotypes... Obviously,
I’m a shooter because I’m White or I’m slow and less athletic because I’m
4
White... When I dunk on somebody, it’ll be like, ‘Oh, Chandler Parsons
is deceptively athletic.’ Why wouldn’t I just be athletic?”(Spears 2016)
Thus, there appears to be a belief among at least some players that Black and
White players are viewed differently. Both Thomas and Parsons allude to a particular
sort of effect: rather than merely stating that Black players or White players are
perceived to be better in general, both players specifically note that players’ race
leads to an expectation about how they play. Thomas suggests that Black players
are associated with natural athleticism, rather than practiced mastery or cerebral
thinking. Likewise, Parson suggests that his race leads to the expectation that he
will excel in the less “athletic” task of shooting accuracy, rather than in dunking.
Whether or not there exists an expectation regarding the average productivity of
Black and White players, these players are expressing that there exist expectations
about the aspects of the game in which White (or Black) players do or do not excel.
More succinctly, Thomas and Parsons suggest that it is possible for a basketball player
to “play White.”
If there exist expectations regarding how White and Black players play, does
“playing White” have consequences in the labor market for the players, and if so,
do these consequences depend on the race of the player in question? While there
are perhaps multiple potential hypotheses here, I will investigate a hypothesis guided
by the players’ anecdotal evidence: that the return to “playing White” or “play-
ing Black” is determined by the match with the player’s race. In particular, if a
player’s style and characteristics match expectations given his race, I consider that
player as “conforming” to his racial stereotype. If his style and characteristics do not
match expectations given his race, I consider that player to be “non-conforming.” I
then ask whether players conforming to their stereotype obtain superior labor market
outcomes.
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1.1.2 Research Setting: The NBA Draft
I analyze the impact of players conforming to stereotype among a very particular set
of NBA players: those who are selected in the annual NBA draft. The NBA draft is
an event held between NBA seasons to allocate incoming players (known as “rookies”)
between NBA teams. A principle motivation for this setting is that the market for
rookie players is substantially simpler than that for veteran players in ways that may
make it easier to test the hypothesis of superior labor market returns for conforming
players.
Consider a veteran NBA player deciding where to sign his next contract before an
NBA season. There are several dimensions along which he might compare offers:
 Players’ contracts vary substantially in monetary value. The highest paid play-
ers can earn more than 50 times the annual salaries of the lowest paid players.6
 Contracts can vary in length from one to five years. Individual players may
value the security of a longer contract, or the flexibility of a shorter contract.
 The 30 NBA teams are geographically dispersed across 28 different cities in two
countries.7 The 30 current NBA teams are located in 28 different cities. In
addition to typical locational preferences, players may have preferences related
to their ability to obtain secondary income streams through endorsement and
other opportunities.
 Each team has its own coaching staff, training staff, and team administration
that players may view more or less favorably.
6For example, the minimum salary for an NBA rookie in the 2016-2017 season was $543,471.
Meanwhile, Cleveland Cavaliers forward Lebron James had a 2016-2017 salary of $30,963,450.
7The NBA’s only current Canadian franchise is the Toronto Raptors. However, the Memphis
Grizzlies were located in Vancouver from 1995 to 2001. There are two teams each in Los Angeles
and New York City.
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 Players may desire to play on teams where they will be in championship con-
tention, or attain a minimal level of team success.
 Players may desire to play on a team where they will have a prominent or
starring role.
As such, contracting between teams and veteran players is complicated and overde-
termined; what appear to be lower returns along monetary dimensions may be the
result of voluntary tradeoffs by players.
The market for players entering the league, however, is substantially simpler.
Rookies are primarily allocated across teams via a system known as the NBA draft,
where teams make ordered selections among the available incoming players. For
more details, see Section 1.3.2. The key feature of this process is that once a player
is selected by a team, the team acquires a temporary monopoly on his playing rights.
Thus, the potentially conflicting motives above do not play a substantial role in the
market for rookie labor.8 Given that compensation is largely a decreasing function
of NBA draft order9 and that there is evidence of over-investment of playing time by
teams in players selected earlier in the draft (Staw and Hoang 1995), players have
substantial interest in being picked earlier in the draft. Therefore, if conforming
players are being picked earlier in the NBA draft, we can take this as meaning that
there is a reward in the labor market for stereotype conformity.
8It is technically possible for a player to refuse to come to an agreement with an NBA team
that has drafted him. However, unless the team renounces its right to that player, he would not
be allowed to contract with another NBA team. Given the NBA’s status as the premier and best





This paper contributes to the literature in three broad areas: stereotypes and decision
making biases, differential returns to skill and characteristics by race, and the effect
of race in sports labor markets.
1.2.1 Stereotypes and Decision Making Biases
It is beyond the scope of this paper to summarize the full literature in psychology
and behavioral economics on biases in decision making.10 However, there are two
cognitive heuristics in the psychology literature of particular interest:
 Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek out evidence and interpret new evi-
dence in a fashion consistent with or favorable to existing beliefs, and has been
described as “perhaps the best known and most widely accepted notion of in-
ferential error to come out of the literature on human reasoning.”(Nickerson
1998) In the setting of the NBA draft, team decisionmakers may be more likely
to value skills that fit their prior expectations for players.
 Herding behavior, or the tendency of individual decisionmakers to make choices
in the direction of the crowd, has a long research tradition in economic and
financial contexts. (Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Banerjee 1992; Shiller 2000) As
noted by Romer (2006), this might be particularly relevant for sports decision-
makers. Turnover is high for sports decisionmakers: for example, the median
tenure for NBA coaches heading into the 2016-2017 season was two seasons,
and 5.5 years for general managers. If decisionmakers are more likely to be
punished for deviations from standard practice, this could bias them towards
favored more “typical” players.
10For the interested reader, this literature is well-covered in many works such as Kahneman (2011)
and Thaler (2015).
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Additionally, this paper relates to work on stereotypes, recall, and decision mak-
ing by Bordalo et al. (2016). As the authors note, there are several interpretations
of stereotypes in different strands of the sociology, economics, and social psychology
literature, varying from the “rational stereotyping” framework of Phelps (1972) and
Arrow (1973) to the more sociological angle of stereotypes as primarily derogatory
and factually incorrect generalizations potentially used to maintain existing social sta-
tus quo. In Bordalo et al. (2016) the authors follow the social psychology literature,
viewing stereotypes as cognitive shorthands primarily used to ease the cognitive de-
mands of routine decision making, localized around some “kernel of truth” about the
population in question. The authors develop a model where the recall of population-
level traits is dependent on how “representative” this trait is relative to a comparison
group, or how similar it is to observed experiences. This can lead to misperception in
the direction of representative traits.11 In the context of the NBA draft, this theory
would suggest that more “representative” characteristics for players of a given race
may be more salient or likely to be overemphasized.
Decision making biases can obviously occur in all sorts of settings, and given the
generally high level of interest in sports, it is perhaps unsurprising that this paper is
not the first to look at such questions in the contexts of sports. A significant work is
Romer (2006), which follows earlier work by Carter and Machol (1978) in looking at
whether football teams appear to be engaging in the sort of maximizing behavior that
one would expect from firms. The author finds that teams decisions within football
games, specifically the choice to “go for it” on fourth down, are systematically more
risk averse than win-maximizing behavior. A similar and more directly applicable
finding is Massey and Thaler (2013), where the authors look at teams’ implicit val-
11An example of representativeness would be that while the overwhelming majority of Irish men
and women are not redheaded, they are disproportionately likely to be so compared to any other
comparison group, e.g. Brits or Swedes. Thus, a Bordalo et al. style agent would overweight the
likelihood that an Irish person would be redheaded.
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uation of NFL draft picks via trading between teams. The authors find that teams
systematically overvalue early draft picks relative to the expected surplus value above
salary provided by these players, and that “trading down” for a greater number of
lower picks in the draft increases team success.12(Massey and Thaler 2013) One last
contribution relevant here concerns the roster and playing decisions made by teams
after drafting players. Staw and Hoang (1995) analyze the playing time allocated to
NBA players, and show that higher draft picks are allotted more playing time, are
more likely to be retained as free agents, and are less likely traded conditional on
observable production. The authors suggest that this may be evidence of a sunk cost
bias.
1.2.2 Differential Returns to Skill and Characteristics by Race
There exists a broad and deep literature in labor economics which looks at whether
Black workers experience different returns to skills and/or characteristics.
Perhaps the most well-developed corner of this literature focuses on differences
in the return to education between Black and White workers. In the theoretical
literature, the conclusions depend on modeling assumptions on aspects such as ob-
servability, with models suggesting that the returns to education for Black workers
will be higher (Pinkston 2006), similar to those of White workers (Lang and Ruud
1986), or that it may depend on the level of education. (Lang and Manove 2011)
Related papers have examined in what circumstances we might expect such effects to
12Both these papers raise an interesting concern that is also relevant here: are these decisions the
result of cohesive firm-level behavior, or do principal-agent concerns play a role? Most team owners
have minimal roles in the day-to-day operations of their teams, both in terms of roster construction
and in-game decision making. Moreover, some teams’ ownership is dispersed over several parties
(or, in the most extreme case of the NFL’s Green Bay Packers, over more than 300,000 fans via
“community ownership”). These managerial roles are typically handled by salaried employees. The
typical structure is that the owner employ a general manager who controls roster construction
decisions, and a coach/manager who deals with in-game decisions and player training. Insofar as
teams display biased decision making such as overvaluing players who conform to racial stereotypes,
one can ask where in the chain of command this behavior originates. This may be an interesting
direction for future research.
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increase or decrease over time. (Coate and Loury 1993; Altonji and Pierret 2001) In
the empirical literature, early results suggest that the return to education for Black
workers was lower in the first half of the 20th century, but rose thereafter.13 Addi-
tional work suggested that this trend continued, and that by the close of the 20th
century, returns to education for Black workers were as high or higher than those of
White workers.(Welch 1973; Lang and Ruud 1986; Heckman 1998; Card 1999) Neal
and Johnson (1996) investigated whether the return to “basic skills” as measured by
AFQT scores was lower for black workers, and found instead that it was as high or
higher than that for white workers.
While the topic of returns to education is particularly well developed, it is far
from the only place where researchers have analyzed differential returns for Black and
White workers. Other notable research has found that resumes with stereotypically
Black names receive lower returns to skills in terms of callback rates (Bertrand and
Mullainathan 2004), and that while White workers who receive performance pay see
a rise in earnings in the right end of the earnings distribution, there is no comparable
effect for Black workers.(Heywood and Parent 2012)
1.2.3 The Effect of Race in Sports Labor Markets
Researchers have previously analyzed whether player race had an effect on wages
across several different sports. Specifically, a series of early papers between 1988 and
1991, summarized in Kahn 2000, found that White players in the NBA received an 11-
25% wage premium and tended to be sorted to areas with higher White populations.
(Kahn and Sherer 1988; James V. Koch and Hill 1988; Wallace 1988; Brown et al.
13It may be that this effect is truly a change in the return to a year of education for Black workers
relative to White workers, or alternatively, it could be in part a change in the quality of a year of
education for Black workers, as schools attended by Black workers saw significant improvement in
this time period.
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1991).14 Early findings also suggested that low-quality White players tended to have
slightly longer careers.(Johnson and Marple 1973) However, later papers attempting
to replicate these findings generally found that the wage premium had dissipated.
(Hamilton 1997; Bodvarsson and Brastow 1998; Hill 2004; Dey 1997).15 Similar early
studies in baseball found a premium for Black non-pitchers, although the results seem
to depend on what control variables are used. In the NFL, any wage premium was
statistically insignificant, although there was some evidence that White players were
paid more in White cities. (Kahn 1992, 1993)
Kahn (2000) notes that in general sports labor markets do not have regular firm
entry and exit, so it is not necessarily the case that we would expect discrimination
to be competed away as in many Becker-style taste discrimination models. However,
even if the market in team products is not fully competitive, it may be the case that
the market for player labor is. This implication is explored in Syzmanski (2000). The
author investigates whether there is any evidence of wage discrimination in English
professional soccer. If the market for player wages is competitive, then an owner
who wishes to discriminate must effectively pay a premium in either wins or wages.
Syzmanski confirms this insight by showing that controlling for the teams’ wage bills,
teams with higher proportions of Black players won more games.
Price and Wolfers (2010) and Price et al. (2013) presented a slightly different sort
of finding. They analyzed the decisions of NBA referees, and found that referees
tended to be own-race biased (that is, Black referees favored Black players and White
referees favored White players). Interestingly, a followup study by the authors found
that the effect persisted between the end of their original sample and publication of
14Kahn and Sherer (1988) also reports that teams with White players attracted more fans, and
that the corresponding increase in revenue from attendance was as large or larger than the salary
premium.
15One exception is that Hamilton (1997) found that there may be a premium for White players
at the top of the skill distribution.
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the results, but disappeared thereafter. The authors take this result to imply that
the publication of the original results might have itself caused a change in referee
behavior.
1.3 Background Information
This paper deals with the NBA draft, which is an annual ceremony where the most
coveted first-year players are allocated among the league’s teams. This setting may be
fertile for research for two reasons. Firstly, as Kahn (2000) points out, sports settings
frequently have an unusual abundance of observable data; as such, “sports labor
markets can be seen as a laboratory for observing whether economic propositions at
least have a chance of being true.”(Kahn 2000) The NBA draft provides unusually
readily available data on both signals of employee productivity, and the outcomes of
employer-employee matching and contracting. Secondly, as pointed out by Romer
(2006) and Thaler (2015), sports settings allow us to answer a common critique of
research concerning decision making biases: that while they may appear in peculiar
settings such as laboratories, division of labor and competitive incentives can be
expected to chase away any such effects once stakes are sufficiently high.(Romer
2006; Thaler 2015) The setting of the NBA draft involves players receiving contracts
worth tens of millions of dollars, substantial heterogeneity in player quality, and
decisionmakers whose jobs depend on their ability to evaluate player talent. Thus, it
represents a context where there are large stakes to the decisions at hand, and where
one might expect decisionmakers to act with great consideration.
In this section I briefly describe the institutional setting, including the racial
history of the NBA, the typical contracting between players and teams, and the
structure of the draft itself.
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1.3.1 The National Basketball Association
The NBA currently has 30 teams distributed in 28 cities across the United States and
Canada,16 and these teams typically play an 82-game regular season over approxi-
mately six months followed by a 16-team playoff tournament. Teams can carry up to
15 players on their rosters at a time, and approximately 450-500 players play in at
least one game leaguewide in a typical year.
Like most comparable professional sports leagues, the NBA had an entirely White
player population upon its founding in 1946. However, Chuck Cooper of the Boston
Celtics became the first Black player selected in the NBA draft in 1950, and that
season, he, Nat Clifton of the New York Knicks, and Earl Lloyd of the Washington
Capitols would be the first Black players to play in the NBA (Broussard 2000).17 Bill
Russell entered the league shortly after for the Boston Celtics, becoming the league’s
first Black star as he led the Celtics to 11 NBA championships in his 13 years and
spearheaded the NBA’s first all-Black lineup. While Black players initially reported
being limited by an implicit quota,18 the league quickly became integrated and would
soon become majority Black. In the 2015-2016, 74.3% of NBA players were Black
(Spears 2016); this is approximately consistent with the racial makeup for the last
several decades.19
The terms of contracts between players and teams in the modern NBA are gov-
erned by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the league, its owners, and
the union representing players, the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA).
16Prior to the addition of the Charlotte Bobcats in the 2004-2005 season, the league had 29 teams.
This was the only expansion or contraction in the league during the time period studied in this paper.
17None of these three were the first non-White player in the league; that honor belongs to Japanese-
American Wataru Misaka, who briefly played for the New York Knicks in the 1947-1948 season
(Vecsey 2009).
18Russell reportedly characterized the belief that there was a limit on the number of Black players
by saying that teams could play “two at home, three on the road, four if we’re behind” (Schladen
2016).
19For example, Kahn and Sherer (1988) reported that the league was approximately 75% Black.
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Both individual player and total team wages are constrained by a complex set of
rules collectively referred to as the salary cap; the principle feature of the salary cap
is that it sets minimum and maximum wages both for individual players and teams as
a whole.20 Players under contracts may be traded between teams; however, a player
under contract cannot unilaterally decide to switch teams prior to the end of their
contract. New contracts between players and teams are typically between one and
five years in length,21 and are typically negotiated during a period known as “free
agency” between seasons. Teams have certain advantages in the form of right of first
refusal or exceptions to the salary cap when retaining their own players.
1.3.2 The NBA Draft
There is one class of players for whom the player-team matching and contracting is
especially peculiar: players entering their first season, or “rookies.” Unlike free agents,
rookies generally are not free to agree to play for the team of their choosing. Instead,
they must go through a process known as the NBA draft. Upon being eligible to
enter the league,22 players are entered into the pool of players to be allocated among
the teams each June. Each team is allotted two selection slots (known as first round
and second round picks),23 and selection order is approximately determined by last
20These terms only bind the contracts between teams and players; many elite players obtain
secondary income streams related to their role in the NBA, such as endorsement contracts from
apparel companies. For elite players, these can be substantial: Berri et al. (2007) report that
Michael Jordan’s endorsement income was so large that he had the higher income than any NBA
player in 2004, a year after he had retired from the NBA.
21Contracts as short as 10 days exist; however, teams are limited in how many consecutive 10-
day contracts they may offer players before they are required to switch to a contract for the full
remainder of the current season. Previous CBAs also allowed for longer contracts.
22Eligibility is somewhat complicated, but eligible players can be broadly divided into three groups:
college players who have completed their senior season, college underclassmen who have foregone
subsequent college athletics eligibility and declared themselves as “early entrants,” and foreign play-
ers. For years prior to 2006, there was a fourth group: domestic players entering the league directly
after their high school playing careers. This last group is was no longer eligible under the 2005 CBA.
For further details, see Appendix A.2.
23The 1997 draft featured one fewer selection as a result of NBA sanctions against the Washington
Bullets for violating the league’s salary cap rules, and the 2001, 2002, and 2004 drafts each featured
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year’s win-loss record.24
During a ceremony held each June, each team selects a player in order until all
teams’ picks have been exhausted, and the players selected are then removed from the
pool of available players for later selections. Once a team selects a player, they acquire
the exclusive rights to negotiate a contract with him for two years. While a player
nominally could “hold out” and refuse to play for the team that selects him, this is in
practice not a concern for teams given the NBA’s status as the marquee worldwide
professional basketball league. The structure of contracts is rather limited by the
CBA, and salaries are generally declining in order of selection.25 The combination of
teams’ monopoly rights, the limited variety of contracts, and lack of a comparable
outside option means that players are effectively unilaterally assigned to teams for
the beginning of their careers.
Teams have strong incentives to choose wisely in the draft. There is considerable
heterogeneity in player quality and teams can frequently successfully identify superior
prospects, as seen by the higher productivity of players selected earlier in the draft
in Figure 1·1.(Barzilai 2016) Additionally, given that the contracted wages under the
rookie scale are low compared to the typical wages for veteran players, identifying a
high-quality player in the draft can result in a substantial bargain for the team in
a salary-cap constrained environment. Due to the combination of advantages that
teams have under the CBA in resigning their own players and maximum salaries that
have historically been well below the value of top players, identifying a “star” in the
draft can pay returns for many years in the future.
one fewer first round pick due to similar sanctions against the Minnesota Timberwolves.
24This is not precisely true for the final ordering, for two reasons. Firstly, teams may trade their
picks for other teams’ players and picks. Secondly, the NBA holds a “lottery” for the teams that
did not make the previous season’s playoffs. Teams with worse win-loss records in the previous
season have higher probabilities of receiving early picks. This introduction of randomness is done
to mitigate teams’ incentives to intentionally lose games in order to receive a higher draft pick, a
process known as “tanking.”




My sample consists of all players selected in the NBA draft from 1997 to 2019 with
available college basketball statistics. There were 1,362 total selections over this time
period, of which 1,059 are ultimately included in my sample. I exclude 303 drafted
players for whom information about their college basketball statistics was unavailable,
who fall into one of three categories:
 For drafts prior to 2006, American or Canadian players could declare them-
selves eligible for the NBA draft immediately following completion of their high
school career. The NBA CBA was changed in 2005 to effectively ban play-
ers from entering the draft directly following high school. While high school
entrants were uncommon prior to the late 1990s, between one and nine high
school entrants were selected in each sample year prior to 2006, including mul-
tiple players selected first overall. After 2005, domestic players could enter the
league if they were at least 19 years old and at least one year removed from
their high school class’s graduation date. If they did not attend college, such
players could train independently, attend a post-grad year at a prep school, play
internationally, or play in the NBA D-League, a developmental minor league
launched in 2001. There were 47 such entrants who were ultimately selected: 36
before the change in eligibility rules and 10 after, plus one additional domestic
player who attended college for one year but was ruled academically ineligible
and never played college basketball.
 Beginning in the 1990s, foreign players without American college experience
began to enter the NBA draft in significant number. Most of these players had
previously played for amateur and/or professional teams in other countries.
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Each sample year includes between five and twenty foreign draftees (250 total).
 Lastly, six players played college basketball domestically, but did so at a lower
level of competition such that their statistics are not readily available.
To increase sample size and mitigate selection bias, I also collected information
about eligible players who were not drafted. I supplement the sample of drafted
players with all college seniors among the five leading scorers on any team included in
the Associated Press’s Top 25 Poll at any point in each season. This poll is a weekly
survey of sportswriters and broadcasters identifying a consensus of the best teams
in college basketball at any point in time. As such, it has substantial overlap with
drafted players. Seniors on these teams are assumed to be potential draftees if not
selected, as they are generally automatically eligible.26
For each player in the sample, I obtained his height, position, college year, and
performance statistics. These statistics include points scored per game, assists per
game, rebounds per game, blocks per game, steals per game, field goal attempts
per game, three point attempts per game, free throw attempts per game, field goal
percentage, three point percentage, and free throw percentage.27 I also recorded the
state in which the players attended college, and whether his team competed in one
of college basketball’s “major conferences.”28
26Approximately 18.5% of such players are subsequently drafted. In a given year, there exist
additional potential draftees: “early entrant” players who declare themselves eligible for the NBA
draft prior to their senior year, but who go undrafted. These players are not as of yet systematically
identified, and thus are currently omitted. There may also be strong negative selection effects for
these players if, for example, the player in question was asked to leave his college team or declared
ineligible to play college basketball.
27Nine players are removed from the sample because some of this information is missing. For
part of the sample, minutes played, offensive rebounds, turnovers, and personal fouls per game are
available. However, these are systematically missing for several years in the sample and are thus not
included.
28Following traditional practice, this includes the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big East, Big
Ten Conference, Big 12 Conference, Pacific 12 (Pac-12) Conference, and Southeastern Conference
(SEC). Prior to a two-team expansion in 2011, the Pac-12 Conference was known as the Pac-10
Conference.
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Additionally, for each player in the sample, I have hand-coded his respective race
as White, Black, or Other. Within my sample, the latter group is sparsely populated,
and predominantly made up of Hispanic and Afro-Caribbean players. This categorical
assignment is done on the basis of Google Image Search results and players’ Wikipedia
articles, and is necessarily imprecise.29
To identify the relative needs of drafting teams, I collect information on the stock
of players on each NBA team in the prior season. Specifically, I identify “retained
players,” or those who played on a given team in the seasons immediately preceding
and following each draft. This measure is meant to proxy for the stock of players that
teams use for planning purposes when drafting, as some proportion of the previous
season’s players would be expected to leave via free agency or trades in the offseason.
I calculate the years of experience and win shares30 of the retained players on each
team at each position.31
To gain a measure of the differences in fan communities that may impact re-
ceptivity to White or Black players, I collect information on the population of the
Metropolitan Statistical Area in which each team plays and the proportion of that
population that is White.32
29In particular, players were categorized as “other” only if this process led to affirmative evidence
that they were identified as belonging to another ethic group. It is, therefore, a lower bound on the
number of such players.
30Win shares are a composite measure of players’ contributions to team success in any given
season, and are commonly used in the basketball analytics community as a measure of player quality.
Approximately, a team with players contributing 50 win shares would win 50 games in expectation.
More details can be found at https://www.basketball-reference.com/about/ws.html.
31Information on player age is available, but is highly correlated with years of experience and thus
omitted. Additionally, I use the win shares of the retained players per game, extrapolated to an 82
game season, rather than actual win shares to account for players who may have been acquired in a
trade midseason or injured. Neither of these choices materially affects results.
32I also collected the proportion of the MSA population that was Black; however, including both
variables in the model had the unintuitive quality that while they are inversely correlated, the
interaction of race and each variable are positively correlated. Thus I omit the proportion of the




Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for players’ characteristics based on race and
draft outcome.
Among both drafted and undrafted players, Black players substantially outnumber
White players. Conditional on being in the sample, Black players are approximately
12% more likely to be drafted, and conditional on being drafted, are taken approxi-
mately one pick earlier. Among those drafted, they are substantially more likely to
be early entrants. They are also more likely to play the guard position compared to
White players, and correspondingly less likely to play the center position. Relatedly,
White players tend to be taller (guards are typically the shortest players on the court
and centers the tallest).
Differences in per-game statistics are not especially stark, with perhaps the ex-
ception of rebounds, assists, and steals. These differences are explained by the dis-
tribution across positions; guards typically accumulate more assists and steals, and
fewer rebounds. Further, examining the breakdown by race and position in Table 1.2
shows that in some cases the positional distribution between Black and White players
hides within-position differences between Black and White players.33
1.5 Empirical Framework
The analysis conducted has two key stages. First, I estimate the degree to which a
player does or does not conform to his racial stereotypes with a random forest model.
Then, I estimate the effect of this measure of stereotype conformity on draft outcomes
with a conditional logit model.
33This is effectively an instance of Simpson’s Paradox. For example, White players at each position
have a higher three-point percentage; however, Black players are more likely to play guards and
guards have higher three point percentage, resulting in a higher overall average for drafted Black
players.
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1.5.1 Stereotype Conformity Estimation
The first vital step in an analysis of the effect of “playing White” on a player’s draft
stock is to measure the degree to which he “plays White.” Similar to an analysis
undertaken by Price and Wolfers (2010), I use the collected data on each player to
predict his race. The authors use a probit model to predict players’ race. There are,
however, substantial disadvantages to this approach. Specifically the econometrician
must decide how the relevant variables enter the model, and which interactions if any
to include. Do, for example, blocks have the same implications for categorization
across all positions? Is there relevant information included in combinations of statis-
tics? It is difficult to answer these questions a priori and burdensome to include all
possible interactions. Thus, there may be advantages to a less parametric approach
in estimating the degree to which players conform to stereotypes of their respective
races.
This paper follows a non-parametric approach from the machine learning literature
known as random forest modeling. For a more thorough introduction to random forest
techniques, see Breiman (2001) and the author’s online guide. Broadly speaking,
random forests are an ensemble learning extension of classification and regression trees
(CART). Classification trees categorize observations via “decision trees,” where each
node divides the observations according to one of the input variables until the training
dataset is completely divided into homogeneously classified bins. An example of such
a tree and more details are given in Appendix A.3. As classification tree methods are
known to be prone to overfitting, random forest models create many trees by sampling
with replacement to create a “forest” of trees. For each observation, it will be in the
training set for some trees, and in the validation set (known as being “out-of-bag”)
for others. Using the trees for which each observation is out-of-bag, we are able to
obtain unbiased measures of the error rate of the model. By repeated independent
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resampling and methods to decrease correlation across trees, this method avoids the
overfitting common to classification trees while retaining their fluidity of handling
interactions absent explicit specification by the econometrician. This tends to give it
strong prediction results compared to other methods.
Additionally, we can use the out-of-bag trees to create predictions for each ob-
servation. This will be the primary purpose of this stage: I use the random forest
model to obtain predictions for whether the model believes players to be White or
Black based on their other observable characteristics. Random forest models gener-
ate two sorts of predictions: predicted category, and vote share. The former assumes
that an observation belongs to the class to which it is assigned by a plurality of the
trees (or in the case of a two-category problem, a majority). In the second case, the
“vote share” is the proportion of out-of-bag trees which assign an observation to a
particular category. If, for example, 82 out of 100 trees assigned an observation to
the “Black” category, the former measure would mark this observation as Black, and
the latter assign it a value of 0.82.
In this particular case, I am interested in the second measure, the vote share
obtained from the ensemble of trees. This measure is taken as the degree to which
a player is conforming to stereotype. For example, a Black player who the model
predicts to be Black with high probability is taken to be conforming to racial stereo-
type; conversely, an identically playing White player is taken to be playing in a
non-conforming fashion, as is a Black player predicted to be Black with low proba-
bility.
I consider three iterations of inputs to the random forest model:
1. The most parsimonious model features only the pure performance statistics:
points per game, rebounds per game, assists per game, steals per game, blocks
per game, field goal percentage, free throw percentage, three point percentage,
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free throw rate, and three point rate.34
2. The second specification adds to these measures players’ heights.
3. The last specification, which I take as my baseline model, adds other characteris-
tics that are not strictly speaking part of the player’s on-court performance: his
position, major conference status, and the number of years of college experience
prior to his draft entry.
1.5.2 Modeling the Selection Process
Following this first stage, the output measure is entered along with player and team
information into a conditional logit model.
In this model, each team i selects the player j from the set of available players
J with the highest utility Uij = ηij + εij, with εij distributed Type 1 extreme value.




There are three particular advantages of this model:
 It reflects the fact that each team faces a slightly different choice set than the
teams that choose before or after them, as players are removed from the set J
sequentially as they are chosen.
 It allows for team-varying match variables with each pick. Examples of such
variables include whether a player played his college career locally, whether the
team has a glut of talent at a given player’s position, or whether there is a large
White population in the MSA which the team plays in.
 It allows for the possibility that a player’s draft position may be dependent on
the available alternatives in his particular year, at each particular draft slot. For
34“Percentage” statistics are defined as the number of shots made divided by number of shots
attempted, and thus measures shooting accuracy. “Rate” statistics are defined as the number of free
throw / three point attempts divided by field goal attempts, and thus measure how often players
attempt free throws and three point shots.
23
example, one might imagine that it would be a “bad” year to be a high-quality
center entering the draft if there were several other high quality centers in the
draft that year, or if teams with earlier draft slots already possessed high-quality
centers on their rosters.
In the baseline specification, I include the players’ race ri, predicted race r̂i, and
the interaction between these two variables, where the coefficient of interest for the
hypothesis of a return to conforming to racial stereotype is the last of these. This
can be shown to be equivalent up to a transformation of coefficients to a specification
which includes ri, r̂i, and the absolute difference between them, di = |ri − r̂i|.35
Section 1.6 presents this version of the model.
The baseline specification for the conditional logit model includes as controls (1)
player characteristics as defined in the previous section, (2) the years of experience
and win shares of the players on each team’s roster at the draftees’ respective po-
sitions, and (3) the interactions between the race of the player and demographic
characteristics of the teams’ MSAs.36 Thus, in the model as specified above, I have
the following form for the utility to team i of selecting player j:
Uij = ηij + εij = rjα + r̂jγ + (rj × r̂j)β +Xjµ+Wijδ + Zijφ+ εij (1.1)
where rj and r̂j are race and predicted race of player j, Xj is a vector of player j’s
characteristics, Wij is a vector of the match variables between the player j and the
team i’s current roster, and Zij is a vector of the match variables between the player
j’s race and the MSA that team i plays in. My outcome measure for each player-team
observation is whether player j was selected by team i. Thus, for a player j ∈ J , I
35See Appendix A.4.
36As this last group would be identical across alternative players for a given selecting team, it is





1,Player j was selected with the ith pick in the year t draft
0, otherwise
For each pick i, the available alternatives include all players in that year’s sample
who have not yet been drafted - their actual pick, those chosen with picks i′ > i,
and those not selected at all. The latter group is obviously impractically large: the
overwhelming majority of college basketball players are not selected. As mentioned in
Section 1.4, the group of “near-selected” players included in this analysis is somewhat
smaller - it includes any additional player who (1) completed their senior year, (2)
was not drafted, and (3) was one of the five leading scorers on a team included in the
AP Top 25 poll at any point during the most recent college basketball season.
Given the hypothesis that there will be a positive return for a player conform-
ing to stereotype, I am primarily interested in the coefficient β on the interaction
term between the player’s race and the player’s predicted race, which this hypothesis
predicts to be positive.
1.6 Results
The results of the model can again be viewed in two stages. First, I obtain predictions
for each player’s race using a random forest model trained on other players in the
sample period. Then, I present the results from the conditional logit model as to
whether stereotype conformity has any effect on players’ draft results.
25
1.6.1 Random Forest Analysis
As described in Section 1.5.1, I use a random forest model to generate a measure
of stereotype conformity for each player via the share of out-of-bag trees that label
a player as Black. This measure is meant as a proxy for the degree to which an
observer (or NBA decisionmaker) might say the player plays like other Black (or
White) players. A Black player who is predicted by a high share of decision trees
within the model can be said to conform more closely to racial stereotypes than one
who is predicted to be Black by a lower share of decision trees (and vice versa, for a
White player).
For this to be a valid measure of racial stereotype conformity, there are two things
that must minimally be true: firstly, the model must be able to distinguish between
White and Black players based on other observable characteristics in aggregate. Sec-
ondly, there must be some heterogeneity within the groups of Black and White players
in the degree to which the model is able to accurately classify individual players. The
former of these requirements can be viewed as whether the model is able to estab-
lish a “statistical stereotype” for players of a given race, and the latter as whether
there is variation in the degree to which players entering the draft conform to these
stereotypes.
Figure 1·2 displays the density of the predicted race for draft entrants by race,
where a value of of 1.00 indicates that all out-of-bag trees in the model classified a
player as Black. A perfectly predictive model would thus have all of its mass around
0 for White players, and 1 for Black players.37
We can observe a few facts about the distribution of players’ predicted race.
Firstly, the distribution is quite different for White and Black players, which is en-
37The results presented here exclude players of other race, such as Hispanic players. These form a
very small proportion of the sample - approximately 1.6% of all players, and is largely composed of
players of Afro-Carribean descent. Including these players and treating the classification categories
as “White” and “non-White leads to qualitatively similar findings, as shown in Table 1.5.
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couraging for this exercise. Secondly, the model is much better at correctly identifying
Black players. This is unsurprising given the composition of the sample - as approx-
imately 80% of the sample are Black players, the model begins with a strong prior
that any individual player is Black.38
Given that the model is able to differentiate between White and Black players in
aggregate and there are non-trivial differences among individual players’ predicted
race within these groups, this method appears to produce a valid measure of racial
stereotype conformity for individual players.
1.6.2 Effect of Stereotype Conformity on Draft Outcomes
Having established a measure of racial stereotype conformity for the players in the
sample, the next stage is to test whether this measure has an observable impact on
whether and when players are selected in the NBA draft using a conditional logit
model as specified in Section 1.5.2.
Table 1.3 presents the results of the estimating Equation 1.1 on the sample of
potential draftees from 1997-2019. A few facts are observable in these results. Firstly,
the coefficients for variables not directly related to race largely have the expected
sign: players who are more productive are generally positively rewarded in terms of
likelihood of selection, as are taller players, younger players, and those who played in
more competitive college basketball conferences. Similarly, the coefficient on “Team
Match (Win Shares per Game)” is negative, which suggests that players are less
likely to be selected if the selecting team already has productive players at that
position on its roster.39 Secondly, turning to the variables of interest, neither race
38It is possible to ameliorate this fact via sample stratification - essentially forcing the model
to oversample White players and undersample Black players relative to their observed frequencies.
Unsurprisingly, this has the effect of improving the model’s accuracy with respect to White players
at the expense of its accuracy with respect to Black players. The results of these models are
qualitatively similar, and available by request.
39The only coefficient with an unintuitive sign is rebounds per game, but this coefficient is small
and not statistically significant. Field goal attempts per game is also negative, but this is to be
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nor predicted race are themselves statistically significant predictors of draft selection,
but their interaction is positive and statistically significant. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that players are positively rewarded for conformity to racial stereotypes,
as it suggests that a Black player is more likely to be selected if the first-stage model
is able to accurately categorize his race. A one standard deviation increase in the
predicted race score for a Black player is rewarded similarly to an increase of 1.19
points per game, compared to only 0.24 points per game for a White player.40
Table 1.4 shows how the coefficients for variables related to players’ race are
affected by the inclusion of different controls. Column (8) corresponds to the baseline
specification from Table 1.3. The primary variable of interest, the interaction between
players’ race and predicted race, is stable in significance and magnitude as control
variables are added. In particular, it is not affected by the inclusion in Column (9) of
interactions between players’ performances statistics and their positions, which allows
for those statistics to have differential impacts for different positions (e.g., rebounds
may be rewarded differently for guards vs. centers).
Table 1.5 presents additional robustness checks for these results, where Column
(1) reproduces the baseline model’s coefficients, Column (2) is a specification with
a quadratic term for stereotype conformity ((ri − ri)2) rather than absolute value
(|ri − r̂i|), and Column (3) includes all non-White players rather than just Black
players. Neither of these changes meaningfully affects the results.
Lastly, Tables 1.6 and 1.7 address heterogeneity in the effect of racial stereotype
conformity within the sample. I investigate two types of heterogeneity: across draft
year, and across different stages of the selection process.
Table 1.6 addresses the question of whether the effect of stereotype conformity is
expected, as it indicates less efficient scorers, holding points per game constant.
40It is of potential interest that the coefficients on race and predicted race are both positive;
however, they are quite imprecisely measured, and their magnitude varies based on the included
control variables as seen in Table 1.4.
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consistent across time. I find that there is substantial heterogeneity in effect between
the early and late periods of my sample. The coefficient on the interaction term is
much smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant from 1997-2005, but large
in magnitude and statistically significant from 2006-2019.41 While the selection of
when to split the sample is somewhat arbitrary, 2006 is chosen because it is the first
year of a large structural change in the draft: the exclusion of players entering the
draft directly from high school. It is not clear based on this analysis why the effect
is heterogeneous over time; it may be due to the aforementioned change in draft
eligibility, changes in the characteristics and play-style of draft-eligible players, or
changes in how team decisionmakers evaluate players.
Table 1.7 addresses the question of whether the effect of stereotype conformity
affects players differently based on where they lie in the skill distribution by looking
at whether the effect primarily operates through the intensive margin (i.e., where
players are selected in the draft order, conditional on the player ultimately being
selected in a given year’s draft) or the extensive margin (i.e., whether a player is
selected by any team). The analysis, although necessarily less precise due to sample
splitting, is suggestive that the mechanism for the effect is primarily concentrated in
the back section of the draft, and in particular, along the extensive margin. I find
that racial stereotype conformity is not a significant predictor within the sample of
selected players (Column (2)), and that in particular, it is not a significant predictor
of whether these players are selected in the first 14 “lottery” picks,42 in the first round,
or highly within the second round (Columns (3) through (5)).43 Additional evidence
41The result is not sensitive to exactly when the sample is split; there is a similarly stark contrast
in the coefficients when the last year of the earlier period is placed in any year from 2003 through
2013.
42These are the picks initially allocated via weighted random lottery to teams that did not make
the previous season’s playoffs, and generally regarded as the most promising selections.
43While this is suggestive, none of these coefficients on the interaction term are significantly
different from Column (1) at the 5% level; only Columns (2) and (6) are significantly different from
Column (1) at the 10% level.
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of the importance of the extensive margin is given by the last column, which looks
at those players not already selected in the first round (i.e., second round selections
and non-draftees). The coefficient in this subsample is statistically significant at the
10% level and is nearly identical to the baseline model, suggesting that the primary
channel for the effect may be on whether marginal players are selected at all.44
1.7 Conclusion
I find that it is possible to identify incoming players in the NBA draft as having
characteristics and play styles that are relatively more (or less) typical for players
of their race, which can be taken as a higher (lower) level of conformity to racial
stereotypes. I find that these players are positively rewarded in the draft, with the
effects concentrated in more recent years’ drafts and along the extensive margin of
selection.
There are several potential directions for further work on this topic:
1. Most narrowly, this analysis excludes “early entrants” who go undrafted, high-
school entrants, and foreign players from its draft sample; it may be worthwhile
to include these players.
2. This exercise is largely theoretically agnostic. Nonetheless, it might be fruitful
to develop a theoretical model that could motivate the findings of this paper.
3. It is unclear why the effect intensifies for more recent cohorts, or why it primarily
seems to operate along the extensive margin. Further work could seek to identify
the cause of these trends.
4. Looking beyond the draft itself, it would also be interesting to know whether
stereotype conformity has additional implications for players’ future careers.
44The analysis presented in Table 1.7 is qualitatively similar, but with higher magnitude coeffi-
cients, when I limit the sample to the 2006-2019 period. Results available by request.
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For example, do these players go on to have more productive careers as NBA
players, either conditional or unconditional on draft position?
More broadly, this finding has potential implications far beyond the narrow setting
studied in this paper. After all, the NBA draft is hardly the only labor market
where employers seek to determine which prospective employees are most likely to
be productive based on incomplete information and potentially subject to decision-
making biases. In these respects, it is similar to many if not most labor markets. In
fact, relative to other labor markets, it is perhaps surprising that one can observe
these effects for potential NBA draftees. NBA decisionmakers have the benefit of an
abnormally rich information set concerning their prospective employees, and conduct
their choices with an abnormally high degree of public visibility and accountability.
Insofar as the available information set is less rich for other hiring managers and they
are less likely to have to explain their selections publicly, we may expect to see greater
evidence of a stereotype effect in other labor markets. Thus, the evidence presented
here is suggestive of the potential for similar phenomena on a wider scale.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics for Drafted and Undrafted Players
in Sample
White, Black, Other, White, Black, Other,
Characteristic Drafted Drafted Drafted Undrafted Undrafted Undrafted
N 157 878 17 303 1032 21
Position: Guard 0.197 0.416 0.412 0.472 0.578 0.619
Position: Forward 0.478 0.473 0.353 0.386 0.369 0.333
Position: Center 0.325 0.112 0.235 0.142 0.053 0.048
College Year: 1 0.083 0.181 0.059 0 0 0
College Year: 2 0.14 0.196 0.294 0 0 0
College Year: 3 0.159 0.229 0.235 0 0 0
College Year: 4+ 0.618 0.394 0.412 1 1 1
Major Conference 0.739 0.793 0.824 0.637 0.734 0.524
Height 81.162 78.487 79.088 78.317 76.796 76.381
(3.114) (3.198) (3.795) (3.612) (3.279) (3.471)
Points Per Game 15.953 15.896 15.613 11.008 11.794 12.814
(4.186) (4.099) (3.863) (3.328) (3.363) (3.529)
Assists Per Game 2.177 2.61 2.765 2.148 2.299 2.648
(1.556) (1.724) (1.764) (1.388) (1.49) (1.438)
Rebounds Per Game 7.166 6.273 6.6 4.555 4.722 4.403
(2.407) (2.395) (2.728) (1.939) (1.987) (2.673)
Field Goal Attempts Per Game 11.152 11.594 11.538 8.176 9.038 9.939
(2.967) (3.072) (3.177) (2.477) (2.613) (2.519)
Steals Per Game 0.927 1.247 1.354 0.905 1.061 1.106
(0.464) (0.564) (0.56) (0.451) (0.471) (0.402)
Blocks Per Game 1.012 0.958 0.902 0.444 0.494 0.514
(0.828) (0.933) (0.759) (0.484) (0.534) (0.664)
Three-Point Rate 0.246 0.254 0.228 0.389 0.322 0.412
(0.215) (0.176) (0.202) (0.254) (0.224) (0.255)
Free Throw Rate 0.445 0.431 0.434 0.355 0.379 0.313
(0.159) (0.144) (0.136) (0.156) (0.147) (0.173)
Field Goal Percentage 0.507 0.49 0.488 0.471 0.463 0.457
(0.064) (0.062) (0.066) (0.065) (0.064) (0.074)
Three-Point Percentage 0.304 0.31 0.312 0.33 0.304 0.332
(0.183) (0.149) (0.236) (0.129) (0.157) (0.153)
Free Throw Percentage 0.751 0.727 0.741 0.753 0.722 0.733
(0.094) (0.093) (0.111) (0.093) (0.097) (0.101)
The sample of drafted players includes all non-international draftees with available college basketball statistics,
and the sample of undrafted players includes any additional college seniors who were among the five leading
scorers on teams listed for at least one week in that year’s Associated Press Top 25 Poll. Major Conference
is an indicator for whether a players’ team played in one of the Atlantic Coast, Big East, Big Ten, Big 12,
Pacific 12, and Southeastern Conferences. Field Goal Percentage, Three-Point Percentage, and Free Throw
Percentage are defined as the proportion of the relevant shots that a player makes, while Three-Point Rate































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3: Baseline Conditional Logit Model Coefficients
Dependent variable:
Player Selected




Predicted Race x Race 1.325∗∗
(0.521)
Points per game 0.234∗∗∗
(0.066)
Assists per game 0.277∗∗∗
(0.031)
Rebounds per game −0.016
(0.026)
Field Goal Attempts per game −0.092
(0.090)
Steals per game 0.314∗∗∗
(0.085)
Blocks per game 0.295∗∗∗
(0.054)
Field Goal Percentage 0.052∗∗∗
(0.016)
Three Point Percentage 0.004
(0.003)
Free Throw Percentage 0.012∗
(0.006)
Three Point Attempt Rate 0.015∗∗∗
(0.004)








Major Conference College 0.645∗∗∗
(0.084)
Team Match (Win Shares Per Game) −0.022∗∗∗
(0.007)
Team Match (Experience) 0.008
(0.017)
Team Match (State) 0.167
(0.162)
Interact: MSA Size and Black −0.00000
(0.00000)
Interact: MSA % White and Player Black −0.015
(0.010)












*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
The sample includes Black and White non-international draftees
with available college basketball statistics and any additional college
seniors who were among the five leading scorers on teams listed
for at least one week in that year’s Associated Press Top 25 Poll.
Field Goal Percentage, Three-Point Percentage, and Free Throw
Percentage are defined as the proportion of the relevant shots that
a player makes, while Three-Point Rate and Free Throw Rate are
defined as Three Point Attempts and Free Throw Attempts Divided
by total Field Goal Attempts. Major Conference is an indicator for
whether a players’ team played in one of the Atlantic Coast, Big
Ten, Big 12, Pacific 12, and Southeastern Conferences. The χ2 p-
value corresponds to a joint significance test on the three variables






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Predicted Race: Black / Non-White 0.336 1.140 0.236
(0.439) (1.635) (0.443)
(Predicted Race: Black / Non-White)2 −0.672
(1.316)
Race: Black/Non-White 0.513 0.343 0.715
(0.908) (0.968) (0.910)
Predicted Race x Race 1.325∗∗ 1.547∗∗ 1.171∗∗
(0.521) (0.685) (0.525)
Observations 84,512 84,512 87,243
Pseudo-R2 0.250 0.250 0.249
χ2 p-value 0.000 0.001 0.002
Conformity Measure Abs. Quad. Abs.
Include All Non-White Players No No Yes
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
The baseline sample includes Black and White non-international draftees
with available college basketball statistics and any additional college seniors
who were among the five leading scorers on teams listed for at least one
week in that year’s Associated Press Top 25 Poll. Column (1) replicates
the regression reported in Table 1.3. Column (2) reports the equivalent of a
specification where the absolute deviation term di = |ri− r̂i| is replaced with
a quadratic deviation term di = (ri − r̂i)2. Column (3) reported the same
specification as Column (1) but includes all other non-White players in the
sample together with Black players. The χ2 p-value corresponds to a joint
significance test on the three (four) variables included in this table.
37




Predicted Race: Black 0.336 1.460∗ −0.655
(0.439) (0.779) (0.552)
Race: Black 0.513 1.883 −0.851
(0.908) (1.443) (1.165)
Predicted Race x Race 1.325∗∗ 0.078 2.621∗∗∗
(0.521) (0.898) (0.662)
Observations 84,512 27,382 57,130
Pseudo-R2 0.250 0.223 0.276
χ2 p-value 0.000 0.031 0.000
Years 1997-2019 1997-2005 2006-2019
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
The sample includes Black and White non-international draftees
with available college basketball statistics and any additional college
seniors who were among the five leading scorers on teams listed for at
least one week in that year’s Associated Press Top 25 Poll. Column
(1) replicates the regression reported in Table 1.3, while Columns (2)
and (3) report the same specification within the relevant subsamples.
The χ2 p-value corresponds to a joint significance test on the three




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1·1: Relative Player Value by Draft Pick
Figure from Barzilai (2016), where the author presents the average relative value
produced by players taken with each pick of the draft from 1980 to 2003 in terms of
win shares produced over either the first four years of players’ careers or their entire
careers. Win shares are a composite measure of players’ contributions to team
success in any given season, and are commonly used in the basketball analytics
community as a measure of player quality. Approximately, a team with players
contributing 50 win shares would win 50 games in expectation. More details can be
found at https://www.basketball-reference.com/about/ws.html.
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Figure presents the probability density function of the outcome of the random forest
model described in Section 1.5.1, where the measure corresponds to the proportion
of out-of-bag trees that classify a player as Black. The figure specifically displays
the result of the baseline model specification that only includes Black and White
players, and includes all player-specific control variables from the baseline model.
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Chapter 2
Is Personal Identity Political Ideology?
This chapter is coauthored with James Feigenbaum, PhD.
2.1 Introduction
Demographic cleavages—the criteria that divides people into groups (Rae and Taylor
1970)—have always played some role in democratic politics. As James Madison wrote
in Federalist 10, “latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man.”1 But
as a growing body of research has confirmed the popular narrative that Americans
are becoming more politically polarized (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; McCarty
et al. 2016; Gentzkow 2016; Gentzkow et al. 2019), a new fear about factions has
emerged: modern political polarization is causing the nation to “come apart” along
demographic cleavages and that this demographic sorting is contrary to the vision of
American democracy. An example of such a claim was given by The Economist on
the eve of the 2018 Congressional midterm elections in a piece with the subheadline
“All politics is identity politics.”2 They stated:
1Madison continued, judging humanity unfavorably with respect to the inevitability of such
fracturing over relevant or irrelevant divides: “So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into
mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful
distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent
conflicts.”
2A sign of the popularity of this sentiment: Vox, The New Statesman, and the Washington
Examiner all published articles with the same phrase in the title between 2017 and 2020, and the
Washington Post published an article in December 2019 with the opening sentence “It has been said
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America’s founding fathers envisioned a republic in which free-thinking
voters would carefully consider the proposals of office-seekers. Today,
however, demography seems to govern voters’ choices.
Similarly, Ezra Klein introduced his 2020 book Why We’re Polarized by saying:
America is polarized, first and foremost, by identity. Everyone engaged
in American politics is engaged, at some level, in identity politics. Over
the past fifty years in America, our partisan identities have merged with
our racial, religious, geographic, ideological, and cultural identities.
But before lamenting America’s descent into unprecedented levels of political
cleavage and division, in this paper we first ask if the popular narrative is even true.
To answer this question, we start with a simple observation: if political groups are
very demographically dissimilar, then it should be easy to distinguish and categorize
their members on the basis of their demographic characteristics alone. If it is actu-
ally the case that political polarization has taken the form of increasing demographic
cleavages between political camps, it should be easier to correctly classify Americans
into these political camps today than it was in the past. Thus, the predictive accu-
racy of a demographic model of political sorting should increase over time as these
demographics become more informative predictors of sorting and behavior.3
We first verify that political preferences – particularly presidential voting and
party identification – are substantially predictable based on demographics. To do
so, we collect survey data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) from
that all politics is identity politics” in addition to also publishing an article in 2018 titled “People
don’t vote for what they want. They vote for who they are.”
3Some news outlets have built similar quizzes that boast the ability to predict political party
with 12 or 27 non-political questions. The New York Times required only a handful. However, by
using historical data, we are able to look into the past and see whether the ability to perform this
sorting is newly intensified.
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1952 to 2016, building a 64 year repeated cross section recording political preferences,
party affiliation, vote choice, and demographic information. As our question is funda-
mentally one of prediction, we turn to machine learning methods—primarily random
forests—to model the demographic sortability of respondents in each survey wave,
and evaluate the time trend in these models’ predictive power.
Has the intensity of demographic sorting in American politics increased over time?
Our results suggest that it has, but in a particular way. While demographics have
had some predictive power since at least the 1950s—when the ANES data we draw on
begins—from 2008 to today models based only on demographics are growing increas-
ingly powerful. This contrasts sharply with relatively stable levels of predictability
from the 1950s to early 2000s.
When factions are not correlated—political coalitions could cut across race or
class or sex or region—Lipset (1960, p. 13) suggests that “[m]ultiple-group identifi-
cation has the effect of reducing the emotion in political choices.” But what happens
when these multiple-group identities recede in importance or align politically, and it
becomes increasingly easy to sort the body politic by merely its demographic char-
acteristics? There are many potential dangers of severe demographic cleavages. At
America’s founding, Madison worried about the descent into partisan battle, fearing
differences on many dimensions which “have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,
inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex
and oppress each other, than to cooperate for their common good.” Such cleavages
have the potential to create “empathy gaps” that lead to under-provision of govern-
mental services (Alesina et al. 1999). Cross-nationally, Gubler and Selway (2012)
and Desmet et al. (2017) find more civil conflict and less public good provision when
ethnicity and culture cleave a society more sharply. If demographic sorting in politics
is sufficiently complete, it could even be the case that “pseudo-discriminatory” out-
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comes arise unintentionally, if attempts to deprive political rivals are common and
sufficiently overlap with de facto deprivation for demographic groups (Iyengar and
Westwood 2015). Lastly, increased political distance, much like increased cultural
distance (Bertrand and Kamenica 2018), could inhibit social and economic interac-
tions in ways that exacerbate inequality.
Voters are not blind to the demographic tendencies of American political camps.
In fact, Ahler and Sood (2018) find that voters generally correctly discern party
“stereotypes” but tend to misperceive their strength, magnifying the stereotypical
traits of political parties when asked to guess the parties’ demographic composition.4
Thus, even small changes in the demographic predictability of American politics could
lead to large consequence.
Though we focus on demographic prediction of political outcomes—since that is
the most clear application of the worries about a new demographic tribalism—we
also show that our method replicates other findings in the political sorting literature
regarding politically-relevant opinions. Recent work by Tesler (2016) and others has
shown the increasing importance of racial resentment in sorting white, non-college
educated voters into the two parties. We confirm in the ANES data that inclusion of
questions testing levels of racial resentment increase predictive power, and that this
increase has intensified in elections since 2008.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe our empirical strategy
and outline our machine learning methods to develop algorithms that use demo-
graphic survey data to predict political preferences and voting behavior. In Section
3, we describe the ANES, our primary data source. In Section 4, we present our
results, documenting both the relatively strong predictability of political preferences
using demographic data over time and the recent increase in predictability. Section




Our goal in this paper is two-fold: to develop a predictive model to assess how strongly
an individuals’ demographic characteristics can predict or explain his or her politi-
cal choices and then to understand if this predictive power has this changed over
time. Fundamentally, both of these are prediction problems, and we believe that
machine learning methods are the most appropriate tools for this setting. In partic-
ular, our baseline model is random forest estimation.5 In this section, we motivate
this methodological choice, and describe the difficulties and potential solutions in
choosing an appropriate descriptive metric for predictive accuracy that allows us to
compare results across time periods.
2.2.1 Motivation for a Machine Learning Approach
We turn to machine learning tools to understand the changing predictive power of
demographics for political preferences and choices for three primary reasons.
First, our question is essentially a descriptive and predictive exercise. Our analysis
will analyze patterns in the degree of predictability of survey respondents’ political
alignments and voting based on their demographics, rather than modeling any par-
ticular causal relationship between demographics and political outcomes. While work
on causal estimation using machine learning techniques is an active field of research
(Wager and Athey 2018; Chernozhukov et al. 2018, for example), it has long been
recognized that many of the tools in supervised machine learning are better suited
for settings where the goal is to predict outcome variables (“ŷ problems”) rather than
5As we show in Appendix B.3, our conclusions are qualitatively robust to alternative methods,
such as logit models, extreme gradient boosting, or elastic nets.
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those where the goal is to consistently estimate causal parameters (“β̂ problems”)
(Mullainathan and Spiess 2017). This means that our research setting distinctly
plays into the relative strengths of machine learning estimation.
Second, we expect our research setting to be rife with interaction effects. Simple
examples abound: while Hispanics in much of country lean Democratic, this rela-
tionship has been found to be much more tenuous or even reversed among Hispanic
voters in Florida and Cuban-American Floridians in particular (Grunwald and Caputo
2018) Similarly, while the South has voted solidly Republican since Nixon’s Southern
Strategy and the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act (Kuziemko
and Washington 2018), southerners are nonetheless sharply divided across parties by
race. It is clear that the predictive power of a given variable (i.e., state of residence
or ethnicity) might vary among subgroups. This suggests that any analysis of polit-
ical alignment and voting should strongly consider modeling such interactions, but
including all possible interactions would quickly become cumbersome. The decision
of which interactions to include is non-trivial, and any particular choice would involve
a great deal of discretion by the researcher. Luckily, many machine learning methods
are robust to interaction effects without a priori specification by the researchers and
allow the data to dictate the relevant higher-order interactions.
Third, and particularly in light of the potential presence of important interactions
between demographic factors, it is difficult to motivate any particular functional form
for the relationship between voters’ demographic characteristics and political out-
comes. In the absence of strong theoretical priors on the nature of this process, there
is great value in choosing methods that are flexible and minimal in assumptions. One
advantage of many common machine learning methods is that they are nonparametric
and do not assume any particular data generating process (Breiman 2001).
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2.2.2 Random Forest Estimation
Our main specification uses random forest estimation. Random forests are successors
to classification and regression trees (CARTs), which categorize observations via a
series of “decision trees.” Decision trees partition a training data set through a series
of successive split rules along the predictors until the observations are sorted into
homogeneously-classified bins. CARTs are known to be particularly high-variance
estimators and prone to overfitting; random forests address this issue by creating an
ensemble of many trees where each observation is in the training set for some trees
while being in the hold out sample (known as being “out of bag”) for others. These
out-of-bag trees can then be used to obtain unbiased estimates of the model’s classifi-
cation rate for each observation, by treating the prediction of each individual tree as
a “vote” and classifying each observation according to which categorical label receives
the highest “vote share.” Thus, through repeated resampling and additional steps to
reduce correlation across trees, random forests address the overfitting of CART mod-
els while retaining their fluidity in non-parametrically modeling interactions without
explicit prior specification.6
We create a random forest for each data cohort; that is we separately model the
relationship between demographics and political outcomes separately for each year of
the ANES data. The choice of predictive variables —features in the machine learning
terminology–is further details in Section 2.3, where we describe the ANES data in
more detail.
6For a more complete introduction to random forests, see Breiman (2001) or Hastie et al. (2008).
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2.2.3 Measuring the Accuracy of Our Models: ROC Curves and AUC
Measures
Having created a model for each cohort, there remains an additional question: how
should we evaluate the predictive power of the demographic predictors in each co-
hort so as to enable comparisons across time? Random forests generate a natural
measure, classification accuracy rates. However, as we detail below, this measure
has features that make it unappealing for this task. Instead, we propose a different
summary measure know as AUC (Area Under Curve). This measure has appealing
statistical properties for our setting, and an intuitive interpretation in binary classi-
fication settings: when presented with a randomly chosen pair of observations from
each of the binary outcome classes (i.e., a Democrat and a Republican), the AUC
is the probability that the model will correctly label the pair. This property makes
it an appropriate measure for our question, as it can be interpreted as a measure of
how easily an observer can correctly guess someone’s political affiliations or voting
habits from simply knowing their demographic characteristics. In periods when this
measure is higher, that suggests that the “guessing game” is comparatively easier.
As mentioned above, a random forest model classifies each individual based on
the vote share of trees for which that individual was not in the training sample.
Given the model’s classification of each individual observation, this can be compared
to their actual categories and we can measure the classification accuracy rate across
the sample. While this provides an intuitive metric, it has two weaknesses that are
especially troubling in our setting.
The first concern arises from the fact that our data contains unbalanced samples
with respect to our outcome categories. This is the norm for political survey data:
Americans have been found to be consistently more likely to self-identify as conser-
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vative than liberal, or as Democrats than as Republicans.7 In addition, the partisan
and ideological composition of our sample ebbs and flows with the electoral cycle.
This presents a difficulty for our analysis, in that it renders it difficult to make firm
statements about the comparative predictive power across time due to changes in
the baseline levels for the most common outcome class. Predictive accuracy might
mechanically increase in years with less variance in the outcome variable. Consider,
for example, one hypothetical cohort’s model that achieves 75% accuracy in a sample
with 60% Democrats, and another that achieves 80% accuracy in a sample with 70%
Democrats. The latter model could be said to have a greater absolute level of pre-
dictive power, while the former achieves a larger gain in predictive power compared
to the naive baseline of simply guessing the most common class. Given that the two
models are solving problems of different “difficulty,” it is hard to know how to rank
or order the predictive power of the two models.
The second concern is that classification accuracy is potentially too crude of a
measure to fully capture the information contained in our models, and risks under
or over estimating how informative demographics are to a real world observer. This
is because classification accuracy does not account for the degree of confidence in
the prediction. Consider two individuals: one accurately classified as Republican by
60% of trees, and one accurately classified as Republican by 80% of trees. Arguably
the second individual’s demographic profile was more informative, as it led to a more
confident prediction.8 Binary classification accuracy coarsens this distinction. Insofar
as our model seeks to imitate the predictability of Americans to their peers, this
represents a meaningful loss of rich information.
An ideal measure of predictive accuracy would be robust to class imbalance, and
7This latter fact can also be observed in voter registration data.
8Conversely, in an example where both of these individuals were misclassified, the latter case
could be said to be a larger error.
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incorporate measures of predictive confidence. Luckily, as neither of these are new
problems in classification analysis and machine learning, there is a measure that solves
both of these concerns: the Area Under Curve (AUC) for the Receiver Operator
Characteristic (ROC) curve.
Consider any classification model that labels observations as belonging to a given
class (i.e., Democrats) if a summary measure for that observation (i.e., proportion of
trees classifying that observation as a Democrat) crosses a specific threshold. If that
threshold is decreased, the model will be more likely to accurately label Democrats
(the “true positive rate”).9 However, it will also be more likely to classify Republicans
as Democrats (the “false positive rate”). This represents the classic modeling tradeoff
between Type I and Type II errors. ROC curves directly model this tradeoff by
plotting the true positive error rate as a function of the false positive rate. For an
example, see Figure 2·1, where the axes represent the true positive rate and false
positive rate. The 45-degree line represents any model that randomly assigns classes
with a given probability. A model can be said to be preferable to another if, for a
given false positive rate, it has a higher true positive rate.10 Therefore, we could
comfortably say that the 2016 model represented by the blue line is a more predictive
model than the 2000 model represented by the red line.
For any ROC curve, we can calculate a summary measure of its accuracy: Area
Under Curve (AUC), or the integral of the ROC curve. A model randomly assigning
classes will have AUC = 0.5, while a perfect classifier will have AUC = 1.0. In
addition to providing a ranking criteria, his measure has an appealing probabilistic
interpretation: AUC is equal to the probability of correctly labeling observations in
a binary “guessing game.” Suppose that a given random forest model has AUC =
9For example, if one set a threshold value of 0, all observations would be labeled as Democrats.
10Note that this is similar in spirit to the concept of stochastic dominance. One model could be
said to dominate another if, for all false positive rates, it has a higher true positive rate.
51
0.75. This can be interpreted as saying that when presented with a randomly chosen
Democrat and a randomly chosen Republican, the Democrat will be labeled as such
by a higher proportion of trees in 75% of all cases.11 AUC has two particularly
appealing properties in light of the above discussion: it is robust to class imbalance,
and rewards models that make relatively more confident predictions.
Given these appealing characteristics and intuitive interpretation, we evaluate the
predictive power of demographic characteristics by comparing the evolution of model
AUC over time rather than looking at classification accuracy.
2.3 Survey Data on American Political Attitudes and Demo-
graphics
To predict voter preferences based on demographics, we need individual-level data
that includes both rich demographic characteristics and political outcomes. We draw
such data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) which covers more
than 60 years of American political history.
2.3.1 ANES Background
The ANES is a national repeated cross-section survey of public opinion and political
behavior based on a probability sample of U.S. citizens age 18 or older. It has been
conducted in most national election years since 1948.12 Respondents are asked a series
of questions about their demographics, partisanship, ideology, media consumption,
and opinion on political issues and candidates.
11Fawcett (2006). This measure is also equivalent to the Wilcoxan-Mann-Whitney test.
12A survey wave has been conducted in every presidential election year since 1948, and was
conducted in every midterm election year from 1954 to 2002. We exclude the 1948 and 1954 survey
waves, as they did not include several important demographic characteristics about respondents.
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2.3.2 Political Outcomes
Our primary interest is in the predictability of Americans’ political preferences as a
function of their characteristics. There are many potentially relevant and interesting
ways to measure political preferences. Here we focus on three measures that are
consistently found in ANES data.
First, we study party identification. Respondents in every survey wave since 1952
have been asked to classify themselves as a Democrat, Republican, independent, or
none of the above. Those respondents answering either of the last two categories are
subsequently asked if they lean towards either party. We group together “leaners”
with their respective party, and drop all other observations.
Second, we turn to political ideology. Respondents in every survey wave from 1972
onward have been asked to classify themselves as liberal, moderate, conservative, or
none of the above.13
Third, in additional to self-assessed party identification and ideology, we also study
presidential vote choice. In every survey wave corresponding to a U.S. presidential
year since 1948, respondents are asked whether and how they voted in the presidential
election. We exclude respondents who report that they did not vote or voted for a
third party candidate.14
13The survey question also asks the respondents whether they consider themselves extreme liberal,
liberal, or slightly liberal (and likewise for conservatives). We collapse these categories. Survey
waves from 1984 onward have included a followup question where respondents describing themselves
as “none of the above” or (in most years) moderate are asked what they would pick if forced to
choose. To maximize data comparability, we do not include this information.
14In some years, ANES has conducted vote validation exercises to verify respondents’ registration
status and turnout. For discussion of the relative frequency of vote overreporting and characteristics
predictive of those who report having voted but are not found to have done so in official voting files,
see Belli et al. (2001). As this is not conducted consistently across survey waves and it is not possible
to identify which individuals’ votes were validated in our sample, we do not use this information.
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2.3.3 Predictors of Political Outcomes
ANES contains rich information about respondents’ demographic characteristics, be-
havior, and beliefs. However, the survey has significantly expanded in scope over the
period in question. Thus, not all information available today is available for respon-
dents in previous cohorts. Likewise, many questions asked in previous waves have
been dropped from the survey.
Our baseline model includes as predictors the following variables which are gener-
ally available from 1952-2016: age, gender, state, race, religion, church attendance, ed-
ucation, marital status, income, employment status, union membership, and parental
nativity.15 These characteristics have the additional advantage of being relatively
pre-determined at the time of survey. While it is plausible that there exists some ele-
ment of reverse causality with respect to political affiliation and behavior for some of
these variables (Egan 2020), this worry is mitigated by the fact that we are primarily
interested in obtaining predictive rather than causal measures. Additionally, these
characteristics map well to our research question, which is how easily an observer can
accurately gauge a person’s politics from their outwardly observable characteristics.
ANES also has many variables that ask respondents for their opinions about gen-
eral governance principles (i.e., whether the government is run by a few big interests
or the benefit of all), specific issues (i.e., whether they support allowing homosexual
people to serve in the armed forces), or various institutions and groups (i.e., the mil-
itary or Asian Americans). In general, the inclusion of this information presents a
few concerns:
1. Many of these questions are not consistently asked throughout our entire sample.
2. While the characteristics in our baseline are likely to be readily apparent to
15For details about each of these variables, see Appendix B.1.
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those who know an individual, these sorts of opinions may be significantly less
observable. Therefore, their inclusion may be inappropriate when trying to
approximate what an observer can infer about individuals.
3. Many of these may be very highly correlated with political affiliation to a de-
gree that makes them essentially proxies for political affiliation. To choose an
extreme example, one’s opinion about the Democratic party is extremely pre-
dictive of whether one identifies as a Democrat, to a degree that it is clearly
inappropriate to include in this exercise. Even for less extreme examples such
as support for gay marriage, it is not clear in what direction we would expect
causality to run between issue-specific beliefs and political affiliation.16
Thus, we regard these variables as less central to our research question than those
included in our baseline specification. Nonetheless, we analyze the effect of including
some of these variables in Section 2.4.2.
2.3.4 Congressional District Level Information
We also observe ANES respondents’ Congressional district of residence, and can link
this to the Foster-Molina Congressional District dataset going back to 1972. This
dataset includes information on characteristics of each district such as racial com-
position, share of residents that are foreign born, share of residents with a college
degree, unemployment levels, or DW-Nominate scores for the partisanship of their
representative.
While these measures could potentially be useful, they come with concerns due to
the endogeneity of congressional districts. Unlike administrative units such as town
or county, Congressional districts frequently change in our sample due to reapportion-
16Lenz (2013) found that voters may change their beliefs to match their preferred candidate rather
than choose a candidate that matches their beliefs.
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ment, and this process has frequently been suggested to be sensitive to political bias
due to gerrymandering. In terms of our research topic, the relevant question would
be whether knowing where someone lives has had differential predictive consequences
over time. It may be that which administrative unit one lives in (i.e. county) has
been equally predictive across time, but that Congressional district has become in-
creasingly so due to an increasing tendency of reapportionment to choose borders that
“pack” communities of similar political leaning together. In this case, Congressional
district would do a poor job of approximating the predictive power of the information
that would likely be available to an observer, which is the respondent’s community of
residence. Therefore, we worry that including information about respondents’ Con-
gressional districts is ill-suited to our question. Nonetheless, in Section 2.4.1, we show
that this information does not qualitatively change our results.
Rather than include measures for Congressional districts, we would prefer to iden-
tify within-state variation in metrics like unemployment rate using exogenously pre-
determined geographic boundaries such as county of residence. Unfortunately, due to
privacy concerns, this data is not publicly available for survey waves after 1998. We
are working to obtain restricted access to this information from the administrators of
the ANES surveys.
2.4 Results
In this section, we show that political preferences can be predicted from demographics
alone and that this predictability has grown dramatically in recent years.
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2.4.1 How Predictable Are Political Preferences?
Before analyzing whether the predictive power of demographics has increased in recent
years, the first preliminary task is to confirm that demographics have meaningful
predictive power. As discussed in Section 2.3, we believe that the most appropriate
way to do so is to analyze the ROC curve of the model’s predictions. For results in
terms of binary classification accuracy, see Appendix B.2.
For an example of ROC curves that result from our model, see Figure 2·1, which
plots the ROC curve for predicting respondents’ party affiliation in the 2000 and 2016
cohort waves. There are two things to note about these plots. First, in both cases, the
curve lies well above the 45 degree line, which indicates that individuals’ demographic
profiles are predictive. Second, comparing the models from the two cohort waves, it
is clear that the 2016 model dominates the 2000 model: for any false positive rate,
the 2016 model returns a higher true positive rate (or conversely, for any given level
of the correct classification rate, the model for the 2016 survey wave will return fewer
incorrect classifications). Taking these two models in isolation, that fact suggests
that it is easier to accurately assess an individual’s party affiliation based on their
demographics in 2016 than it was in 2000.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, the most appropriate summary measure for these
models is the Area Under Curve (AUC). In addition to providing a framework to rank
models, it has the appealing intuitive interpretation that it is the probability that the
model will correctly label the Democrat in a randomly chosen Democrat-Republican
pair. In keeping with the ROC-dominance observed in Figure 2·1, the AUC for the
2000 and 2016 cohorts is 0.710 and 0.775 respectively. This indicates that it would
be 6.5% percentage points easier to correctly identify the Democrat in a Democrat-
Republican pair in 2016 than in 2000 knowing only the characteristics included in our
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baseline model.
Moving beyond this isolated example, the trend in AUC of the baseline model for
each of the three outcome variables can be seen in Figure 2·2. The following facts
emerge:
 The model always performs much better than random chance (AUC=0.5), with
measures typically taking values above 0.7. However, demographics are hardly
perfectly predictive; this measure does not rise above 0.85 for any of the three
outcomes.
 While there is variation in the predictive power of a demographic model, here
is no obvious time trend for years prior to 2008.
 The predictive accuracy of the models for party affiliation and presidential vote
jump sharply in 2008-2016, with a more modest and gradual rise for ideological
identification.
Results for different estimation techniques (logit models, extreme gradient boost-
ing, and elastic nets) are presented in Appendix B.3, and are qualitatively similar.
While the trend is visually stark, one might reasonably ask whether it represents
a real shift in the American electorate or a chance occurrence. We test this as follows.
First, we perform a Chow test for structural break. Next, we permute the observed
AUC measures to create 1,000 new time series and perform a Chow Test for each
point in the time series. We then identify in each permuted time series the largest
test statistic, and rank our actual observed test statistic for each outcome variable
against the 1,000 permutations to see how many identify a structural break as strong
or stronger anywhere in the time series.
It is worth pointing out, however, that this method suffers from severe limitations
due to sample size and the relatively few data points after the observed structural
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breaks. The analyses for party affiliation, presidential voting, and ideological identi-
fication contain 29, 17, and 20 cohorts respectively. As such, there is a risk of failing
to identify a structural break due to low power.
Nonetheless, as seen in Table 2.1 , both tests show significant evidence of structural
breaks for party identification and presidential vote. Both show highly significant
structural breaks in the 2008, and the observed test statistic lies in the upper tail of
the simulated values.
Models with Congressional District Controls
As discussed in Section 2.3.4, it is possible to link respondents to demographic infor-
mation about their Congressional district of residence from Foster-Molina. However,
given potential partisan bias in redistricting following the decennial Census, there is
strong reason to believe that any predictive gains from this information may not rep-
resent true changes in the predictive value of knowing respondents’ place of residence.
Nonetheless, we test a model where we add these measures to our baseline set of
variables. The results are presented in Figure 2·3. It appears that the added predictive
power of these additional variables is mostly negative. Broadly speaking, this is
consistent with the addition of “noise” variables in a random forest model, where
the inclusion of additional variables that are uninformative or already implicitly well-
incorporated via other variables makes trees less likely to hone in on more predictive
variables.17 We are investigating whether there might be a better way to incorporate
this information into the model.
17This specifically can happen due to the features of random forest models that are meant to
decrease correlation across trees. One of these features is that at each node, the algorithm does not
choose the optimal splitting variable; instead, a random subsample of the variables is chosen, and it
chooses the optimal splitting variable among this subsample. The addition of noise variables means
that relatively predictive variables are less likely to be chosen in this sample, and can lower overall
predictive power.
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One implication of this is that worries about the endogeneity of Congressional
districts is a moot concern, because these variables are not meaningful predictors and
little is lost by excluding them.
Which Variables Matter?
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, this paper is primarily a descriptive, rather than causal,
exercise in that we are not attempting any causal explanations of the relationship be-
tween demographic characteristics and the predictability of political behavior. Indeed,
since any sort of exogenous variation approximating random assignment seems im-
plausible for most of the variables used, we are skeptical that any causal framework
would be possible or appropriate here.
One implication of this approach and our methodology is that is difficult to pro-
vide the equivalent of the easily interpretable coefficients from a regression model.
However, many machine learning applications lead to what are known as “variable
importance” measures, which provide evidence of the degree to which a model’s re-
sults rely on particular inputs.
We present one form of such an estimator here: a leave-on-out random forest
AUC. For each of our outcomes, we iteratively remove each of our input variables
from our sample and reestimate the model’s AUC in each cohort. We then subtract
this AUC from the baseline AUC, with the difference providing the relative loss in
predictability. While we caution that these are not causal estimates and that they
do not even represent the “informativeness” of each variable per se,18 this provides
18A natural interpretation of this measure might be that variables with a small loss in predictive-
ness are “uninformative” with respect to political preferences. This interpretation is not necessarily
true, because it may be the case that if variables are highly correlated, information can be indirectly
incorporated via another variable. Therefore, it is more accurate to say that this measure tells
us how marginally informative a variable is, conditional on the information provided by all other
variables.
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some suggestive evidence as to ebbs and flows over time in the relationship between
individual demographic characteristics and political preferences.
A few noticeable trends emerge. The state of resident has become less central to
prediction of party affiliation since the mid-20th century, which broadly corresponds
to the decline of the “Dixiecrat” era of Southern politics. Correspondingly, race has
become a more central predictor, especially in very recent years. There is also an
unsurprising spike in the centrality of religion in the 1960 election, which corresponds
to the election of John F. Kennedy, the first Roman Catholic U.S. president. Lastly,
ideology does not display the same trend as party affiliation and presidential vote
with respect to race.
2.4.2 The Predictive Power of Racial Resentment
While our results show that respondents’ characteristics have a great deal of predictive
power for the political affiliations, behavior, and ideology, they are clearly not the
only predictive variables. It is especially likely that opinions on issues related to
politics may substantially increase predictive power. While it is the case that such
variables are subject to all of the concerns mentioned in Section 2.3.3, we consider
one particular hypothesis that has been discussed in the political science literature
regarding levels respondents’ levels of “racial resentment.”
While it has been widely acknowledged that race is a vital explanatory factor of
American voting patterns (e.g., Kuziemko and Washington (2018)), another factor
that is likely to be important is respondents’ views about race. Political scientist
Michael Tesler and others have shown that what they refer to as “racial resentment”
was a major predictor of voting behavior in the Obama era, and that respondents’
levels of racial resentment tend to bleed over into their views about other topics such
as healthcare. Tesler et al. 2018 and several other studies find that these effects
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continued or intensified in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.19 Given the findings
from the literature on this topic, we test whether including measures of respondents’
level of racial resentment increases predictive power.
To test this, we follow Tesler et al. 2012 in coding racial resentment as the
combination of responses to four ANES questions that relate to difficulties faced by
Black Americans, and what steps would be appropriate to remedy these difficulties.
These questions have been asked, albeit with imperfect consistency, since the 1986
survey wave.20 We separately include a more direct measure of racial animosity:
respondents’ answers on a 0 to 100 “thermometer” when asked how they warmly
they feel towards Black people.21 These variables are added to those included in our
baseline model.
Figure 2·5 shows the effect of adding just the question asking for respondents’
feelings about Black people to the model. Figure 2·6 additionally adds the “racial
resentment” questions used by Tesler et al. 2012.
The first observation to be made is that adding in a direct measures of racial
animus has only modest predictive power overall. It creates modest improvement in
predictive power in the 1970s for ideology, and for all three outcomes in post-2008
years, but very little in the intervening years. We do not suggest that this necessarily
indicates that well-measured racial animus would not be predictive; rather, it possibly
reflects that respondents feel that it is socially unacceptable to directly admit racial
19Examples of research on this topic include.
20Tesler combines these questions into a single scaled variable. We include each separately to
incorporate potential interactions. These include (1) whether respondents feel that Black Americans
should be denied any “special favors” due to the ability of Irish, Italian, and Jewish Americans to
overcome prejudice, (2) whether generations of slavery and discrimination create conditions that
make it harder for Black Americans to work their way out of the lower class, (3) whether Black
Americans could achieve as much as whites if they simply tried harder, and (4) whether Black
Americans have gotten less than they deserve over the past few years.
21Other similar questions regarding illegal immigrants, Jewish people, or Asian-Americans are
only asked for more recent cohorts and are not included.
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animosity. This can be seen in the observation that approximately 90% of respondents
give an answer of 50 or above on a scale of 100.
The second observation is that while direct responses about racial animus may be
relatively uninformative, this is not true for measures of racial resentment. Inclusion
of these responses leads to substantial increases in predictive power, and consistent
with the Tesler et al. hypothesis, this seems to increase in magnitude for post-2008
years. It is also noticeable that while the baseline model finds a slight dip in predictive
power in the 2016 survey wave for party affiliation and presidential vote, this effect
disappears with the inclusion of racial resentment measures.
2.5 Conclusion
In light of recent literature and popular press commentary on the increasing role of
demographics in the rise of polarization, we investigate whether the predictive power
of demographics for Americans’ party affiliation, presidential votes, and ideological
self-identification has risen over time using data from ANES surveys. We find that
while there was little evidence of rising predictive power of these variables prior to
2000, there have been sharp increases in their predictive power in post-2000 survey
waves.
This increase in their predictive power suggests that it may be easier for Amer-
icans to deduce each others’ political preference solely from knowing facts about
demographics and identity, and speaks to concerns about potential negative conse-
quences of political tribalism and polarization. The fact that these characteristics are
insufficient to fully sort Americans politically does suggest that there is ample room
for additional predictive factors, even if these are not necessarily as readily evident
to ordinary observers. In particular, we confirm the findings of Tesler et al. 2018 and
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others that “racial resentment” plays an increased role in explaining recent political
sorting compared to previous years.
Additional work on this topic would include extending the methodology to other
data sources to confirm our findings; investigating the causes behind these trends in
predictability beyond our descriptive analysis in Section 2.4.1; extending our models
to a non-binary framework to incorporate the excluded categories of non-turnout /
third party voting, non-affiliated independents, and moderates; and analyzing other
outcomes such as voter turnout.
64
2.6 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary of Structural Break and Permutation Tests
Max Test Max Test Permutation 2008 Test
Statistic Statistic Test Statistic
Measure Value Year p-value Percentile Value p-value
Party Affiliation 15.53 2008 0.00 1.00 15.53 0.00
Presidential Vote 3.48 2008 0.08 0.81 3.48 0.08
Ideological Identification 3.68 1992 0.06 0.81 0.64 0.54
65







































1968 1976 1984 1992 2000 2008 2016
(c) Ideological Identification
67
















1968 1976 1984 1992 2000 2008 2016
(c) Ideological Identification
68












































































1968 1976 1984 1992 2000 2008 2016
(c) Ideological Identification
70


















The Effect of Attending a Charter School
in Newark, New Jersey on Student
Mobility
This chapter is coauthored with Marcus A. Winters, PhD.
3.1 Introduction
Charter schools have gained significant market share in several localities including
the large urban districts of New Orleans; Washington, D.C.; Detroit; and Kansas
City, and at least a quarter of public school students enroll in charters in another 19
districts (Gerstenfeld et al. 2019). As the sector has expanded, a large literature has
emerged quantifying the causal impact of charter attendance on student test scores
in a variety of cities (e.g., (Hoxby et al. 2009; Dobbie and Fryer Jr. 2011, 2013, 2015;
Angrist et al. 2013; Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011, 2017)).1 Researchers have found
across multiple localities that charter schools tend to have positive effects on student
test scores, and this holds true even in districts where the charter sector has been
scaled up to include a substantial proportion of the student base.
1We separately investigate this question in our setting of the charter sector in Newark, New
Jersey in Winters (2020).
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However, critics of charter schools have suggested that this finding may be ex-
plained by differential trends in student mobility. For example, Diane Ravitch has
suggested that one of the causes of test score gains in high achieving charter schools
is that “[t]hey are also free to push out low-scoring students and send them back to
the local public school. This improves their results, but it leaves the regular public
schools with disproportionate numbers of the most challenging students” (Ravitch
2012). Similar concerns have been raised in the public press in several cities (e.g.,
Taylor (2015)), and about students with special education classifications or individual
educational plans (IEPs) (e.g., Tedesco and Webb (2019))
Excessive student mobility out of the charter sector would be additionally con-
cerning given that research has found school switching to generally be associated with
negative effects on education outcomes. This worry would be particularly relevant
for charter schools in large urban school districts that primarily work with minority
and low-income students, as these groups have been found to have the highest rates
of mobility (Welsh 2017; Spencer 2017).
Several previous papers have attempted to address this concern, and have gener-
ally found that student attrition within the charter sector is similar to or less intense
than within traditional public schools, and that this same trend holds for lower achiev-
ing students (Dauter and Fuller 2011; Zimmer and Guarino 2013; Winters et al. 2017;
Spencer 2017). This casts strong doubts on the “push-out” narrative of charter ef-
fectiveness. However, much of this literature has either lacked sufficient exogenous
variation to provide a strong causal interpretation to its findings or has been based on
self-selected data. Thus far, studies using plausibly exogenous variation from school
choice lotteries have been limited to Boston area charters (Angrist et al. 2013; Ab-
dulkadiroglu et al. 2011), where the authors performed subanalyses of mobility in the
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context of a larger study concerning student performance.2
We contribute to this literature by producing causal estimates of the effect of
charter school enrollment on student mobility in one of the nation’s most expansive
and fastest growing charter sectors: Newark, New Jersey. Over a third of the city’s
public school students were enrolled in charter schools as of 2018, with this figure
expected to climb to 44% by 2022 (Wall 2018). Newark Public Schools (NPS) makes
extensive use of a randomized lottery program in assigning students to schools, and
we are able to make use of rich data regarding student’s ranked school preferences
to inform our estimates. This allows us to apply the propensity score approach
developed by Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2017. This also allows us to uniquely address a
concern about mobility that is indirectly caused by students failing to obtain their
highly-ranked schools, which has not been addressed elsewhere in the literature. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to examine the question of charter
schools’ effects on student mobility using this technique or type of preference data,
and provides a unique opportunity for convincing causal evidence.
Consistent with the prior literature, we find that charter school enrollment leads to
significantly less mobility in terms of school changes within Newark Public School dis-
trict and reentry into a later year’s lottery. However, we find that researchers should
be careful in interpreting evidence regarding student mobility even in a randomized
lottery setting. In particular, we find that the lesser mobility within the charter sec-
tor appears to have a nuanced relationship with students’ preferences. While some
of the effect appears to be attributable to the charter schools, much of it is related
to the fact that students who include charter schools in the rankings tend to rank
2In addition to only studying mobility as a secondary analysis, Angrist et al. (2013) only provides
evidence from a single charter program in Lynn, Massachusetts. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) obtains
data from several Boston charter schools, but does not have access to the sort of ranked student
preferences over schools that we exploit in this paper.
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them higher; thus, students assigned to charter schools can be said to have better
met their desired preferences and are less likely to engage in subsequent mobility than
those who fail to attain a spot at their highly ranked schools. We additionally find no
support for the idea that mobility out of the charter sector is especially high among
historically disadvantaged groups such as special education students.
3.2 Data
We rely on two sources of administrative data. We acquired longitudinal adminis-
trative data from the New Jersey Department of Education (NJDOE) for students
attending traditional public and charter schools in Newark from 2011-12 through
2017-18. Relevant data elements include students’ school enrollments, specialized
services enrollment, test scores, and demographics.3 The state’s third party data
manager then matched this data to records from Newark Enrolls, the city’s com-
mon enrollment assignment mechanism operated by NPS.4 Our analysis relies on the
data that the city used to match students to schools for the 2014-15 and 2015-16
school years, which were the first two years of the system. This data includes school
preference orderings and the school assignments resulting from a deferred acceptance
mechanism.
The estimation sample includes students who participated in the initial assignment
round of the 2014 or 2015 Newark Enrolls process for grades K through 115 that are
3Test scores were normalized to be mean zero and standard deviation one within each year-grade
pair, with the exception of high school scores in math, which were normed by subtopic (Algebra 1,
Algebra 2, Geometry) rather than by grade.
4For information about this process, see Appendix C.1.
5We exclude pre-kindergarten applications for several reasons. First, pre-kindergarten enrollment
is fully optional in Newark, and thus there may be severe selection effects. Second, relatively few
charter schools offer pre-K enrollment. Third, NPS offers several schools that are exclusively pre-
kindergarten establishments, which is qualitatively different from traditional public schools in other
grades. Lastly, there is a substantial private pre-kindergarten segment in Newark that operates
outside the Newark Enrolls framework.
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successfully matched to records in the NJDOE data in the pre-assignment and post-
assignment years.6 For analyses that include prior test scores as a control, we are
limited to students who sought a seat in grades 4-9 in the 2014 lottery and grades
4-11 in the 2015 lottery, as students outside these grade ranges were not typically
tested in the pre-assignment year.7
We examine several outcome variables in each year for a student in each year. In
each instance, the initial post-assignment year is viewed as the treatment year, and
we look at outcomes 1, 2, and 3 years after the initial post assignment year.8
 Intra-NPS mobility: a student attended an NPS traditional public school or
charter school in the post-assignment year and then attended a different NPS
traditional public school or charter school in any subsequent year.
 NPS exit: a student attended an NPS traditional public school or charter
school in the post-assignment year and then is missing from the NJDOE data
in at least one subsequent year. This is taken to indicate that the student left
Newark or moved to a private school.
 Lottery reentry: a student attends an NPS traditional public school or charter
school in the post assignment year and then reenters the Newark Enrolls lottery
in a subsequent year.
The first two outcomes represent observed student mobility, whereas the last out-
6Newark Enrolls included a second round for students who had not initially participated, were
unmatched in the first round, or were unsatisfied with their initial assignment. As re-entry into the
second round is potentially endogenous, we only consider participants in the first round.
7Newark students were typically tested in grades three through nine prior to the 2014-2015 school
year; thereafter, testing was expanded to include most students enrolled in grades nine through 11.
In the 2014-2015 school year, New Jersey also transitioned its mathematics and ELA standardized
testing from the New Jersey Assessment of Skills and Knowledge (NJASK) to exams provided by
the Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers (PARCC).
8Due to sample censoring, outcomes 3 years after the initial post assignment year are only avail-
able for the 2014 Newark Enrolls cohort.
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come represents intended mobility. We examine each of these outcomes individually,
the combination of intra-NPS mobility or NPS Exit, and the combination of any of
the outcomes. In all cases, we control for whether the student was affected by any
school closures and whether the student undergoes any structural mobility after ini-
tial post-assignment enrollment, where mobility is deemed structural if the student
has reached the terminal grade in his or her school.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Deferred Acceptance in Newark Enrolls
Our empirical strategy takes advantage of information about student and parental
preferences and student assignments under the city’s common enrollment system that
applies a version of the deferred acceptance mechanism for assigning students to
schools first developed by Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2003. Newark first used this enroll-
ment system, branded Newark Enrolls, to assign students to all traditional public and
magnet schools as well as a large subset of charter schools that chose to participate
for the 2014-15 school year.9 Appendix Table C.1 classifies the participation status
of each charter school.
Each spring, participating parents submit to the centralized school district a rank-
ordered list of school preferences for their child’s enrollment the following year. Stu-
dents are guaranteed admission to their current school if they fail to obtain seats at
any of their ranked schools and it offers the necessary grade level. Schools submit
their number of available seats in each grade. Schools also have ranked priorities for
students based on a few factors. Siblings of students currently enrolled in a school are
9Early in its history, Newark Enrolls was branded as One Newark. Newark Enrolls replaced
lotteries or other selection mechanisms previously used by participating charter schools.
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given first priority, followed by students who live in the neighborhood surrounding
a school. In Newark, schools with below average enrollments of students in special
education and students eligible for free or reduced priced lunch give a priority to
the number of students with those characteristics necessary to bring their proportion
within the school up to the citywide average. Magnet schools additionally provide a
rank ordered list of applicants based on interviews and other criteria. Finally, stu-
dents are provided with a randomly generated lottery number that is used to break
ties for students whose characteristics give them equal priority status.
Newark Enrolls then uses the parental preferences and student priority categories
to assign students to schools via a deferred acceptance mechanism. Each student
is considered for their first preference school, and students are ranked according to
their priority status and assigned random number. If the number of students listing
a school is less than or equal to the number of seats available in a given grade,
these students are provisionally assigned to that school. If instead the number of
applicants exceeds the number of available seats, those students below the allocation
cutoff are then considered for their next most preferred school via the same process
along with the students provisionally assigned in the first step. Thus, a student may
“bump” another student provisionally assigned a seat in the first stage if they have a
higher school priority category, or the same priority category combined with a more
preferred lottery number. This process is repeated iteratively until all students are
either assigned to a school or have exhausted their list of schools. If a student fails to
obtain a seat at any of their listed schools and their current school offers their grade,
they are reseated at their current school or a “guaranteed” school most often based
on their residence.
Unfortunately, the district was unable to provide the specific algorithm used to
assign students, and thus we were forced to replicate the assignment mechanism.
78
Some data limitations prevent us from fully replicating the process. First, due to
not knowing the number of available seats for each school-grade combination, we
instead estimate this based on the number of seats assigned less those that appear
to be assigned based on re-seating for students who exhausted their preferred school
list. Second, the district did not provide the rankings of students applying to mag-
net schools, where admissions decisions could depend on criteria such as auditions,
attendance records, or grades. We instead infer which students are sufficiently highly
ranked for admission based on actual student assignments to magnet schools. Third,
we did not have access to the exact details of priority assignment for special education
or free lunch students; no attempt to replicate it improved assignment accuracy so
this priority is omitted in our simulations. Lastly, for the spring 2015 lottery, we do
not have the results of the initial round of the algorithm; we instead use the final
results after the second round and any manual adjustments made by Newark Enrolls
for students known to have applied in the initial round. Despite these limitations, we
are able to replicate the true seating assignments for 85% of participating students.10
3.3.2 Modeling Student Mobility
In the absence of concerns about endogeneity in the relationship between charter
assignment and eventual enrollment, we could estimate the causal effect of charter
school enrollment on student mobility outcomes as
yit = α + βCiT + γXiT + εit (3.1)
where yit is the outcome of interest, CiT is an indicator for student enrollment in
10The results are not sensitive to changes in how student assignments are modeled. The preferred
results reported in the paper use the version of the assignment algorithm for each cohort year that
assigned the highest percentage of students to the school to which they were actually assigned when
using lottery numbers used by the city for student assignments.
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a charter school in the year following participation in Newark Enrolls in year T , XiT
are control variables, and εit is the error term. However, not all students enroll in the
school to which they are assigned in the initial round of Newark Enrolls; some students
decline offers from participating charter schools, and others gain admission through
later Newark Enrolls rounds or other avenues. In the scenario where compliance
with a student’s initial Newark Enrolls assignment to a charter (or traditional public)
school is correlated with unobserved student characteristics that may also affect yit,
OLS estimation via equation (1) may be biased.
We take two steps to obviate this concern. The first step is to instrument for
charter school enrollment with initial round charter school assignment under the
Newark Enrolls deferred acceptance mechanism. The second step is to control for
student type via the propensity score control method developed in Abdulkadiroglu
et al. (2017)’s study of charter school attendance in Denver. This method allows us
to parsimoniously control for information about students’ type that is indicated by
their submitted preferences while still recovering the full range of quasi-experimental
variation in the data. To do this, we run 500 simulations in each cohort where we
generate new random lottery numbers for each student and estimate the likelihood of
a given student being assigned to a charter school with the proportion of simulations
resulting in charter assignment. This propensity score is then used as a control
variable. Intuitively, this takes advantage of the fact that conditional on a student’s
priority status and submitted preferences, actual assignment is determined by the
randomly generated lottery number. Controlling for the propensity score allows us
to exploit this conditionally random variation in assignment; in effect, it compares
students who did or did not enroll in a charter school while holding constant any
differences in likelihood of enrollment stemming from their preferences and priority
status at each charter school.
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Thus Equation 3.1 is replaced with a two stage least squares regression. The first
stage uses observed student characteristics, the propensity scores described above, and
an indicator for whether the algorithm assigned the student a seat in a participating
charter school to predict whether a student enrolls in a charter school. The second
stage model then uses the vector of baseline characteristics, the propensity score,
and the first stage’s prediction of charter school enrollment to explain the respective
measure of mobility. Formally:
CiT = θ + πAiT + λXiT + φpiT + µiT (3.2)
yit = α + βĈiT + γXiT + δpiT + εit (3.3)
where CiT indicates whether student i enrolled in a participating charter school
following participating in Newark Enrolls in year T , AiT indicates whether student
i was assigned to a participating charter school in Newark Enrolls for year T , piT is
the student’s simulated propensity score for charter assignment, and the vector XiT
includes observed demographic characteristics at the time the student participated
in the enrollment process. The exclusion restriction assumes that conditional on
charter assignment propensity and the other covariates, assignment to a charter school
is associated with charter enrollment but has no other impact on student mobility
outcomes.
The coefficient β from Equation 3.3 can be interpreted as the local average treat-
ment effect on student mobility outcome yit of attending a participating Newark
charter school for applicants who enroll in a charter school following an offer through
Newark Enrolls. This estimate treats as non-compliers students who decline a charter
school assignment or who enroll in a participating charter school due to participating
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in a subsequent Newark Enrolls round or other avenues. The central assumption for
interpreting β as the causal effect of charter school attendance is that the deferred
acceptance mechanism assigns applicants with the same preferences and priorities for
assignment to a school with equal probability.
As discussed in Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2017), an advantage of using a centralized
enrollment system is that it allows us to use identifying variation from a much broader
set of charter schools than is often available when measuring the effect of attending a
charter school in other localities. First, the estimated charter school impact is not lim-
ited to only students attending charter schools that are oversubscribed. All students
with a probability of charter school assignment between zero and one contribute to
the identification of β. Second, the availability of a centralized data set removes the
need to acquire historical lottery records from each charter school individually, which
often leads to the exclusion of many charter schools in a locality. Notably, however,
our estimates only apply to the charter schools that participate in the Newark Enrolls
process. Such schools account for about 70 percent of the city’s charter schools at
the time and enrolled about 85 percent of its charter school students. In order to
compare attending a participating charter school to attending a traditional public
school, which we find to be the most policy-relevant estimate, we include as a control
variable an indicator for whether the student attended a non-participating charter
school.
3.3.3 Covariate Balance
Accounting for the propensity score is intended to control for potential bias from
unobserved characteristics that are associated with both charter assignment and later
student outcomes. We test the plausibility of this method by evaluating whether
observable student demographic covariates are balanced between those offered and
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not offered a charter seat when controlling for the propensity score. Notice that the
measure of charter propensity is entirely based on simulations of student assignments
given parental preference and priority status, and thus did not directly incorporate
the demographic characteristics.
The first two columns of Table 3.1 compare the unconditional observed demo-
graphic characteristics of participants offered or not offered a charter school seat, and
the third and fourth column report the result of the above-described regression with-
out controlling for the propensity score. The two groups are similar with respect to
gender, race, ethnicity, and special education status. However, those offered a charter
school seat are significantly and substantially less likely to receive free lunch, and we
also see a modest but significant difference in the probability that they have limited
English proficiency (LEP) or are eligible for reduced price lunch.
The final two columns report the coefficient and p-value from regressions compar-
ing those offered or not offered a charter school seat in a model that also controls for
charter propensity. Conditioning on charter propensity greatly mitigates the differ-
ences in the demographic profiles of the two groups. The joint F-test reported at the
bottom of the table shows that after conditioning on the propensity score there is no
significant difference between those offered or not offered a charter seat with respect
to these pre-treatment characteristics. This pattern suggests that conditioning on the
propensity score controls for the observable differences between those offered or not
offered a charter seat, which is consistent with giving a causal interpretation to our
estimates. It is then reasonable to assume, but unverifiable, that the propensity score
similarly accounts for unobserved differences between charter school and non-charter
school students.11
11Appendix C.2 provides similar tables for the 2014 and 2015 cohorts separately.
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3.3.4 Controlling for the Indirect Effect of Student Preferences
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to make use of this sort of rich
student preference data to address the question of student mobility. This allows us a
unique opportunity to address a potential identification pitfall in this setting that has
thus far not been specifically addressed in the literature: the potential indirect effect of
student preferences on mobility outcomes, and the possibility for this to introduce bias
into estimation of the mobility effect of charter school enrollment. A direct application
of the propensity score control methodology assumes that students’ preferences matter
insofar as they affect the likelihood that students assigned to charter schools are
different from those who are not. Two students with identical propensity scores would
be expected to behave identically all else being equal, regardless of the composition
of their ranked preferences. However, in the context of student mobility, we believe
there to be a second plausible channel for these preferences to affect student mobility
outcomes at a later point in time.
Consider two students who are assigned to and then enroll in the same charter
school by the Newark Enrolls lottery system, with the only difference being that one
listed the school as her first choice while the latter listed it as her fourth choice.
Defining the treatment as charter enrollment in the initial post-assignment year, they
would both be said to have received the same treatment. However, it seems plausible
that they might exhibit different mobility likelihoods even if they are equally satisfied
with the school and otherwise identical. This is because for the former student, the
school was her most-preferred option, while the latter student indicated that there
were three schools which she or her family found to be preferable. Assuming that
students’ preferences are likely to be somewhat persistent, it is possible that she might
decide to subsequently decide to reenter the Newark Enrolls lottery in hopes of being
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assigned to one of these three schools. If this is the case, she may be more likely to
change schools thereafter.
To make this point more generally, we might expect students to change school
more often in inverse proportion to how highly they ranked their assigned school all
else being equal. Those who are assigned to a school that is higher in their rankings
have indicated an idiosyncratic preference for that school relative to those who ranked
the school lower, and might be expected to be less mobile thereafter.
If the rank of a student’s assigned school is not systematically correlated with
whether the school is a charter or a traditional public school, this is unlikely to
present an opportunity for bias for our main object of interest. However, given the
findings in the literature that charter schools are often oversubscribed and tend to
have positive impact on students’ test scores, this seems unlikely to be the case.
In fact, this is what we observe in our data: 62.3% of those assigned to a charter
school listed it as their first preference, vs 48.8% of not assigned to a charter school.12
Therefore, students assigned to traditional public schools might, all else equal, have
a higher likelihood of mobility due to the students’ preferences.
To adjust for this potential issue, we include as a control in our regressions the
rank 1-8 of the students’ assigned school, with additional flags for not being assigned
to any of their listed schools and for students matched back to their prior school.13
By controlling for the indirect effect of the student’s preferences, we can speak to the
extent to which lower mobility in one sector can be explained by the schools being
initially more preferred by the students and their families rather than the students’
experiences at the schools.
12This calculation includes students who were not assigned to a school listed in their ranking in
the denominator, many of whom were matched back to their prior school. Limiting the calculation
to only students who were matched to a school that they included in their rankings, the discrepancy
is 68.6% vs 62.6%.
13It is possible for students to include their own schools within their listed rankings.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 The Effect of Charter School Enrollment on Intra-NPS Mobility
and Leaving NPS Schools
Table 2 presents our findings for the impact of enrolling in a charter school participat-
ing in Newark Enrolls on the likelihood of students engaging in any school mobility or
lottery reentry at least once 1, 2, or 3 years after the initial post-assignment year.14
As shown in columns 1 through 3, the effect is substantial: we find that charter stu-
dents are between 15 and 23% less likely to engage in any actual or intended mobility.
There are two additional controls that are worth noting. Firstly, a handful of charter
schools do not participate in the Newark Enrolls system (see Appendix Table C.1).
We find no significant effect on overall mobility patterns from enrollment in these
schools. We note, however, that these estimates should be interpreted with caution:
as enrollment in these schools relies on admission processes outside of the Newark
Enrolls framework, we cannot perform the same instrumenting procedure with school
assignments and there is no reason to think that propensity score adequately controls
for student type with respect to these schools. Secondly, we note that the propensity
score itself is somewhat indicative of higher likelihood of mobility. This may indi-
cate that the sort of students who wish to attend a charter school are more likely to
later seek to change schools, irrespective of whether they are actually successful in
attaining a seat at a participating charter school.
However, in columns 4-6, we add the additional controls for the schools’ rank in
the students’ preferences as discussed in Section 3.3.4. All coefficients for the stu-
dents’ rank of assigned school are defined relative to the school being the student’s
14The results for 3 years after the initial post-assignment year only include the 2014 cohort due
to the truncation of our data. For results for the 2014 and 2015 Newark Enrolls cohorts separately,
see Appendix C.2.
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first ranked option. There are three things to note about these coefficients them-
selves: (1) being assigned to a school other than one’s first ranked school consistently
increases the likelihood of later mobility, (2) the magnitude of this effect appears to
be somewhat larger the further down the student’s ranking the school is, and (3) not
receiving an assignment to one of the student’s ranked schools is associated with later
mobility.15
Additionally and more centrally, we note that this greatly decreases the magnitude
of the effect of being assigned to a charter school. We find that the effect, while still
highly significant, is reduced by approximately two thirds. This suggests that while
charter school enrollment does lower the likelihood that students later change schools,
much of this effect can be explained by the fact that the students assigned to charter
schools have expressed stronger preferences for those schools as indicated by their
place in the students’ rankings compared to students assigned to traditional public
schools, and thus have lower incentive to attempt to change schools later on.
In Table 3, we perform the same analysis as columns 4-6 of Table 2 within specific
grade cohorts to look for heterogeneity.16 We find negative effects for students in
kindergarten, grades 1-5, and grades 6-8, and no significant effect on grades 9-12.
While the effect is largest for the elementary school grades, the effects for the first
three groups are not significantly different from each other or the overall effect.
Table 4 analyzes the different outcomes discussed in Section 3.2. For brevity,
only the effect two years later and including controls for the ranking of the student’s
assigned school are shown.17 We see that the observed effect primarily works through
the channel of reduced mobility within the NPS school system; there is no significant
15This outcome is heavily correlated with, but not quite identical to, being matched back to one’s
prior school.
16To conserve space and include both cohorts, we focus on outcomes two years later here. Results
for 1 and 3 year horizons are qualitatively similar.
17For tables similar to Table 2 for each outcome, see Appendix C.2.
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effect for the outcome of exiting NPS schools altogether.18 We also see, as one would
expect, that the decreased intra-NPS mobility for students assigned to a charter school
is accompanied by a decreased tendency to enter later iterations of the Newark Enrolls
lottery.
Overall, the findings suggest that the narrative of charter schools disproportion-
ately pushing children out is unlikely to be true in the setting of Newark Public
Schools, as we see lower observed mobility among students enrolled in charter schools
compared to their traditional public school counterparts.
3.4.2 Low-Scoring and Special Education Students
The above section describes trends in student mobility generally; while the findings
give good cause to be skeptical of the “push-out” narrative, they do not fully address
this argument. This is because it is possible that there is heterogeneity in the mobility
trends of students assigned to charters. The “push-out” hypothesis suggests that
charter schools attain their test score results by encouraging difficult or low performing
students to leave, not necessarily all students. Therefore, it warrants investigation
whether there are categories of students that are disproportionately likely to leave
charter schools.
To test this hypothesis, we perform analyses where we modify the specification
in Equations (2) and (3) to include an interaction term between charter enrollment
and specific student characteristics. This interaction term reveals whether students
with that characteristic are disproportionately likely to leave charter schools relative
to their charter school peers, conditional on their demographics. The results are
presented in Table 5, where the row labeled “main effect” indicates the coefficient
18Analysis by grade level suggests that older students dropping out of school is not a major factor
in either direction.
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on that particular student characteristic for traditional public school students (i.e.,
”Special Education”) and the row labeled ”Interaction” reports the coefficient for
that variable interacted with charter enrollment.
We look at whether charter school students are disproportionately likely to en-
gage in any actual or intended mobility by students’ gender, free or reduced lunch
status, prior special education services enrollment, limited English proficiency services
enrollment, race, ethnicity, and prior test scores.19
As seen in Table 5, we generally fail to find any significant trend of dispropor-
tionate mobility among students enrolled in charter schools for these groups. For
example, while students with lower math or language arts literacy test scores in the
prior year exhibit higher mobility generally, this appears to be no more true among
charter students than traditional public students (if anything, the results suggest the
opposite for math scores but the coefficient is not statistically significant).
The one exception to this is for Black and Hispanic students, where we see that
Black students in charter schools exhibit much lower mobility than their peers and
Hispanic students exhibit much higher mobility. However, a word of caution is in
order about these results: because the population of Newark charter schools is well
over 95% Black or Hispanic, these two results are essentially the converse of each other
because these two groups form the overwhelmingly majority of the comparison group
to each other. This means that if Black students in charter schools are exhibiting
lower mobility, we should expect to see approximately the opposite result for Hispanic
students.
Table 6 compared the results for separate specifications with interactions for Black
and Hispanic students with one that includes both interaction terms, thereby making
19Note that as discussed previously, using prior test scores significantly limits the sample size
because not all grades were tested in the pre-enrollment years.
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the comparison group non-Black non-Hispanic students20. This analysis underscores
the point that the relatively high mobility of Hispanic students in charter schools
is only in relation to Black students; compared to non-Black non-Hispanic charter
school students, they actually exhibit significantly lower mobility.
Thus, our analysis fails to find support for the hypothesis that charter schools in
Newark are “pushing out” the students in these historically disadvantaged categories.
3.5 Conclusion
Newark is one of a growing number of urban areas where the charter school sector
is now operating at a large enough scale to have fundamentally altered the local
educational landscape. We exploit the common enrollment lotteries for charter and
traditional public schools to provide the first causal estimates of the effect of charter
school enrollment on student mobility in such a setting.
Overall, our findings echo the more descriptive findings of the existing literature:
contrary to assertions that test score gains in high performing charter schools are pri-
marily driven by mobility patterns and “pushing out” students, charter schools exhibit
lower levels of student mobility than traditional public schools, and this remains true
even for students from historically disadvantaged subgroups. In particular, our find-
ings are contrary to the hypothesis that the charter schools in Newark are pushing
such students into the traditional public schools, as we find particularly significant
results for intra-Newark mobility.
Taken together with the large literature in other settings for urban charter schools,
20This is a very small category: approximately 1.2% of those in the sample who enrolled in charter
schools in the treatment year. Thus, while the effect of charter school attendance for these students
is large in magnitude, it is measured very imprecisely and is not statistically significant. It is also
possible for student to be both Black and Hispanic, but this is even rarer: approximately 0.4% of
those in the sample who enrolled in charter schools in the treatment year.
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these finds suggest that excessive student mobility in the charter sector is perhaps
less of a concern than suggested, and that mobility effects are unlikely to explain the




Table 3.1: 2014-2015 Covariate Balance With and Without Charter Propensity Score
Variable Non-Offer Mean Offer Mean No Prop. Coef. No Prop. p-val Prop. Coef. Prop. p-val
Female 0.51 0.51 0.00 1.00 -0.02 0.44
Black 0.76 0.78 0.02 0.21 -0.01 0.57
Hispanic 0.22 0.20 -0.02 0.15 0.01 0.54
Free Lunch 0.68 0.53 -0.14 0.00 -0.02 0.38
Red. Price Lunch 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.18
Prev. Spec. Ed. 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.53 0.02 0.04
LEP 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.93
F-stat 13.12 0.00 1.44 0.18
In each row, the second and third columns report the unconditional mean of an indicator variable for the student charac-
teristic listed in the first column for students in the sample who were or were not offered a seat at a participating charter
school via the first round of the 2014 or 2015 Newark Enrolls process. The fourth and fifth column report the coefficient
on charter assignment in a regression of charter assignment and a cohort indicator on the relevant demographic indicator,
while the sixth and seventh column report the same coefficient for a regression that includes the charter propensity score
described in Section 3.2. The final row reports the result of an F-test for joint significance of all the variables listed in the
first column.
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Table 3.2: Effect of Charter Attendance for 2014-2015 Lottery Cohorts
Dependent Variable
Any Mobility or Reentry
1yr 2yr 3yr 1yr 2yr 3yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Participating Charter School −0.191∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.043
(0.025) (0.026) (0.035) (0.025) (0.026) (0.034)
Charter Propensity 0.130∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.019 0.034 0.003
(0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030)
Non Participating Charter School 0.018 0.012 0.002 0.039 0.035 0.031
(0.028) (0.029) (0.041) (0.027) (0.029) (0.042)
Rank 2 Match 0.071∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.017)
Rank 3 Match 0.136∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022)
Rank 4 Match 0.136∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.028)
Rank 5 Match 0.153∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.037)
Rank 6 Match 0.155∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.044)
Rank 7 Match 0.129∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.047) (0.055)
Rank 8 Match 0.269∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.055) (0.056)
No Ranked Match 0.147∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
Matched Backed 0.065∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019)
Rank Controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Grades All All All All All All
Cohort 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014
Observations 13,872 13,872 7,099 13,872 13,872 7,099
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.137 0.157 0.146 0.155 0.171
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: All regressions include controls for students’ gender, free or reduced lunch status, date of birth, special education
status, LEP status, race, ethnicity, neighborhood of resident, grade, Newark Enrolls cohort, non-participating charter
attendance, and whether the students were previous charter attendees or required to move due to school closures or
reaching a terminal grade. The outcome variable is an cumulative indicator for whether the student made an intra-NPS
move, exited NPS schools, or reentered the Newark Enrolls after the initial post-assignment year. Charter propensity is
calculated as described in Section 3.2.
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Table 3.3: Effect of Charter Attendance for 2014-2015 Lottery Cohorts By Grade
Dependent Variable
Any Mobility or Reentry
2yr 2yr 2yr 2yr 2yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Participating Charter School −0.082∗∗∗ −0.064 −0.120∗∗∗ −0.071 0.012
(0.026) (0.066) (0.040) (0.069) (0.062)
Charter Propensity 0.034 −0.033 0.009 0.018 0.096∗
(0.023) (0.062) (0.036) (0.049) (0.051)
Non Participating Charter School 0.035 −0.097∗∗ 0.105∗∗ −0.003
(0.029) (0.048) (0.049) (0.060)
Rank 2 Match 0.069∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) (0.019)
Rank 3 Match 0.158∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.052) (0.033) (0.038) (0.025)
Rank 4 Match 0.184∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.007 0.141∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.078) (0.041) (0.060) (0.032)
Rank 5 Match 0.158∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.099 0.179∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.129) (0.065) (0.070) (0.039)
Rank 6 Match 0.206∗∗∗ 0.386 0.322∗∗∗ 0.054 0.152∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.272) (0.075) (0.083) (0.048)
Rank 7 Match 0.143∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.058 0.035
(0.047) (0.086) (0.107) (0.060)
Rank 8 Match 0.248∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.177 0.111
(0.055) (0.074) (0.121) (0.086)
No Ranked Match 0.168∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.041) (0.022) (0.029) (0.028)
Matched Backed 0.068∗∗∗ 0.031 0.098∗∗∗ 0.049∗ −0.079∗
(0.015) (0.062) (0.022) (0.029) (0.041)
Rank Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grades All K 1-5 6-8 9-12
Cohort 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014-2015
Observations 13,872 3,398 4,161 1,773 4,540
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.048 0.154 0.290 0.068
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: All regressions include controls for students’ gender, free or reduced lunch status, date of birth, special
education status, LEP status, race, ethnicity, neighborhood of resident, grade, Newark Enrolls cohort, non-
participating charter attendance, and whether the students were previous charter attendees or required to
move due to school closures or reaching a terminal grade. The outcome variable is an cumulative indicator
for whether the student made an intra-NPS move, exited NPS schools, or reentered the Newark Enrolls after
the initial post-assignment year. Charter propensity is calculated as described in Section 3.2. Grades are
defined based on the grade that students sought admission for in the Newark Enrolls process.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Participating Charter School −0.082∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.069∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022)
Charter Propensity 0.034 0.036 0.031 0.034∗ 0.026 0.034∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020)
Non Participating Charter School 0.035 0.007 0.009 0.001 −0.004 0.046∗
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026)
Rank 2 Match 0.069∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.005 0.077∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Rank 3 Match 0.158∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
Rank 4 Match 0.184∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
Rank 5 Match 0.158∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024)
Rank 6 Match 0.206∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.041 0.170∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.028) (0.033)
Rank 7 Match 0.143∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.037 0.077∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037)
Rank 8 Match 0.248∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.038 0.217∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.057) (0.059) (0.057) (0.043) (0.057)
No Ranked Match 0.168∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Matched Backed 0.068∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.009 0.085∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Dependent Variable Any Any Non-Structural Any Any Lottery
Mobility or Intra-NPS Intra-NPS Intra-NPS NPS Reentry
Reentry Move or Exit Move or Exit Move Exit
Rank Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ,Yes
Grades All All All All All All
Cohort 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014-2015
Observations 13,872 13,872 13,872 13,872 13,872 13,872
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.158 0.061 0.170 0.024 0.269
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: All regressions include controls for students’ gender, free or reduced lunch status, date of birth, special education status, LEP
status, race, ethnicity, neighborhood of resident, grade, Newark Enrolls cohort, non-participating charter attendance, and whether
the students were previous charter attendees or required to move due to school closures or reaching a terminal grade. The outcome
variables are cumulative indicators for whether the student has engaged in the activity indicated by the “Dependent Variable” row
after the initial post-assignment year. Charter propensity is calculated as described in Section 3.2. For column (3), a move or exit is


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6: Effect of Charter Attendance for 2014-2015 Lottery Cohorts By Race /
Ethnicity
Dependent Variable
Any Mobility or Reentry
2yr 2yr 2yr
(1) (2) (3)
Enrolled Charter −0.011 −0.098∗∗∗ 0.137
(0.031) (0.028) (0.085)
Race: Black 0.080 0.033 0.170∗
(0.089) (0.090) (0.101)
Ethnicity: Hispanic −0.003 −0.044 0.089
(0.088) (0.090) (0.101)
Enrolled Charter x Black −0.095∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.082)
Enrolled Charter x Hispanic 0.071∗∗∗ −0.161∗
(0.027) (0.083)
Rank Controls? Yes Yes Yes
Grades All All All
Cohort 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014-2015
Observations 13,872 13,872 13,872
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.156 0.157
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: All regressions include controls for students’ gender, free or reduced
lunch status, date of birth, special education status, LEP status, race,
ethnicity, neighborhood of resident, grade, Newark Enrolls cohort, non-
participating charter attendance, and whether the students were previous
charter attendees or required to move due to school closures or reaching
a terminal grade. The outcome variable is an cumulative indicator for
whether the student made an intra-NPS move, exited NPS schools, or reen-
tered the Newark Enrolls after the initial post-assignment year. Charter
propensity is calculated as described in Section 3.2.
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Appendix A
Supplementary Material for Chapter 1
A.1 NBA Rookie Wage Scale
As mentioned in the text, the NBA and NBPA CBA sets rules on how drafted players
are compensated.
For players chosen in the first round of the draft, they may agree to a contract
within +/-20% of the ‘scale’ amount for their draft slot specified by the CBA. Table
A·1 includes the rookie scale for the 2016-2017 season for illustration. As of the most
recent CBA applicable in the sample, their contracts include two guaranteed years,
with unilateral team option for the third and fourth year. In the fifth year of these
contracts, teams may make “qualifying offer” to the player at a specified wage; the
player may seek offers elsewhere as a “restricted free agent,” but the team making
the qualifying offer has the right to match any other team’s offer. In the absence of
another team making an offer, the player must agree to the qualifying offer. A team
also has the option of agreeing to a new contract extension prior to the completion
of the player’s rookie deal.
Contracting for second round picks is more flexible. Teams are not explicitly re-
quired to offer contracts to their second round picks; however, if they wish to retain
their exclusive rights, they must offer them a non-guaranteed “tender offer.” Nego-
tiations are not bound by the same requirements as for first round picks, other than
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more general rules regarding all NBA contracts and overall team salaries, and thus
there is nominally more flexibility. However, as the players’ mobility is still limited
by the teams’ exclusivity right, they have limited bargaining ability. Historically,
the contracts obtained in the second round of the draft are often unfavorable to the
players compared to those for first round selections.
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A.2 Details of NBA Draft Eligibility
Eligibility in the NBA draft is somewhat complex. All players must have been eligible
for at least one NBA draft in order to sign a contract with an NBA team; players
eligible for a draft who go undrafted may be signed by any team as free agents. Drafts
included in my sample were conducted under three separate collective bargaining
agreements ratified between the NBA and the NBPA in 1995, 1999, 2005, and 2011,
and thus have slightly different eligibility guidelines. Below I present as an example
the requirements for a player to be eligible to be drafted under the 2011 CBA.
All eligible players must turn nineteen years of age during or prior to the calendar
year of the NBA draft in which they are to be eligible. Players are then divided into
“international” and “non-international” groups.
International players (1) did not complete high school within the United States,
(2) did not attend a college or university within the United States, and (3) have
maintained residence outside the United States for at least three years while playing
amateur or professional basketball. Any player violating any of these three conditions
is deemed non-international.
International players are considered eligible for the draft if any of the following
occur:
 They reach 22 years of age during the calendar year of the draft.
 They agree to play basketball professionally for any non-NBA team within the
United States.
 They express a written desire to enter the draft to the league office 60 or more
days prior to the draft.
For non-international players, there are several ways in which they may become
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eligible to be drafted in a given year. These do have, however, one commonality: for
all such players, in addition to the requirement that they turn 19 years old during
the calendar year of the draft, there must be at least one year between the NBA
draft in which they are to be eligible and their high school graduation. If a player
has left high school without graduating, the graduation year of their high school class
upon leaving is used. Assuming that this is satisfied, a non-international player is
considered automatically eligible in any of the following circumstances:
 He has graduated from a four year college in the United States and is no longer
eligible to compete at the NCAA level. These are not necessarily synonymous
if a player transfers, graduates early, or obtains an extension of his NCAA
eligibility due to injury or other circumstance.
 He has attended a four year college in the United States, is no longer eligible
to compete at the NCAA level, and his college class has graduated.
 The player did not attend a four year college within the United States and four
years have passed since his high school graduation or that of his high school
class.
 The player has signed a contract to play professionally for any non-NBA team.
In addition to these conditions for automatic eligibility, a non-international player
meeting the age and high school graduation conditions may declare himself to be
eligible by expressing his interest to the league office in writing 60 or more days prior
to the draft. These players, largely college underclassmen, are commonly known as
“early entrants.” It is common practice for players to express an interest in being
eligible prior to this 60 day deadline, obtain signals from teams as to whether they
will be drafted and with what pick, and then decide whether or not to withdraw
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their name from consideration. For example, in 2016, 116 underclassmen expresses a
written interest in being eligible, but 57 of these players would withdraw their names
from consideration prior to the 60 day deadline.
This means there are effectively three major classes of players to be considered in
the draft: college graduates, early entrants, and foreign players.
For drafts prior to 2006, there was a fourth substantial class of players: high
school entrants. Prior to 2006, players can and did declare themselves eligible for the
NBA draft following the completion of their high school playing careers. This was
relatively rare prior to the 1990s; however, after the success of high school entrants
Kevin Garnett and Kobe Bryant in 1995 and 1996, the practice became increasingly
popular. It peaked at 9 out of total 60 players chosen in 2005, and included the
first overall picks in 2001, 2003, and 2004. However, the 2005 CBA instituted the
aforementioned requirement that there be a one year gap between players’ high school
graduation and the draft, effectively putting an end to high school entrants. This
has since resulted in many such players playing a single year of college basketball
before entering the draft (commonly referred to as “one-and-dones”). Much more
infrequently, a handful of players spend a year elsewhere, such as playing in leagues
in other countries.
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A.3 A Brief Introduction to Classification Trees
In many problems, the econometrician wishes to take a set of input measures for
each observation, and then develop a classification method or algorithm that bins
observations according to these inputs. One approach commonly used in the machine
learning literature is CART (Classification and Regression Trees). For the purposes
of this paper, I am focusing on classification exercises, although similar techniques
can be applied to continuous outputs (i.e., regression exercises).
Consider a set of players who differ along multiple dimensions, including race,
where the goal is to be able to predict a player’s race via his other observable char-
acteristics. A classification tree functions by developing rules that partition the state
space of variables in a training set, and then applying those rules to other observa-
tions.
Suppose the econometrician has a training set of 5 players where he knows their
race, points per game (PPG), assists per game (APG), and blocks per game (BPG).
 Player A: Black, 8 PPG, 2 APG, 0.8 BPG.
 Player B: White, 10.5 PPG, 4 APG, 1 BPG.
 Player C: Black, 12 PPG, 5 APG, 0.4 BPG.
 Player D: White, 9 PPG, 3 APG, 0.6 BPG.
 Player E: Black, 10 PPG, 3 APG, 1.2 BPG.
One can “divide up” the observations according to PPG, APG, and BPG. In a
classification tree, the splitting variable is chosen so as to maximize resulting purity
of the resulting groupings by class. An example of such a tree is given by Figure A·2.
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By the end of this exercise, the tree has obtained “pure” nodes and there is no
further classification to be done. One can then take additional data and feed it into
the tree to obtain predictions, and evaluate accuracy by the classification of these
“out-of-bag” observations.
Obviously, this method has the potential for overfitting on variation in its training
dataset. CART methodologies have various methods of “pruning” the tree to correct
for this. Generally random forests solve this problem a different way: rather than
trying to obtain the best trees, it attempts to obtain many trees that have different
training sets. To reduce correlation across these trees and improve out-of-bag predic-
tion accuracy, random forest introduce randomness into the choice of variables use to
divide the training datasets. Instead of always choosing the globally optimal variable
to divide upon, the model randomly selects a set of variables (usually, the square root
of the total number of variables) and chooses the optimal variable to divide the data
by among this smaller subset for the greatest classification purity.
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A.4 Absolute Deviation and Interaction Model Equivalency
Consider the “absolute deviation” model as described in the text. For team i, the
utility Uij of selecting player j among the set of available players J , and the probability
πij of selecting player j, are given by





where Xj is a matrix of the player’s non-racial characteristics, Wij and Zij are
match variables, rj the player’s actual race, r̂j the outcome of the first stage of the
model, and dj = |rj − r̂j|, with β being the primary coefficient of interest.
Suppose there are two otherwise identical players, player k White and player l
Black. They differ only in race, rk and the error terms. The respective expected
utilities for each player can be given as:
Uik = r̂(β + γ) +Xµ+Wiδ + Ziφ+ εik
Uil = (β + α) + r̂(γ − β) +Xµ+Wiδ + Ziφ+ εil
∆ = Uil − Uik = β + α− 2βr̂ + (εil − εik)
Now consider an alternative model where instead we include each players race,
first stage output, and an interaction term of the two:
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Uij = (rj × r̂j)ζ + rjκ+ r̂ν +Xjµ+Wijδ + Zijφ+ εij
Compare again the identical White player k and Black player l:
Uik = r̂ν +Xµ+Wiδ + Ziφ+ εik
Uil = κ+ r̂(ζ + ν) +Xµ+Wiδ + Ziφ+ εil
∆ = Uil − Uik = κ+ r̂ζ + (εil − εik)
Comparing the two models, one can make two observations:
 The utility of the White player Uik is identical up to a relabeling of coefficients
(ν = β + γ).
 The difference in utilities between the White and Black player, ∆, is similarly
the same up to a relabeling (κ = β + α, ζ = −2β).
Thus, the implications of the two models can be treated identically. A similar
result obtains for a squared deviation measure if an r̂2 term is added to the interaction
model.
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A.5 Supplementary Tables and Figures
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Figure A·1: NBA Rookie Payscale 2016-17
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Supplementary Material for Chapter 2
B.1 Predictor variable specifications
Our baseline model includes the following respondent characteristics:
 Age: Respondents’ age is coded into age brackets: 17-24, 25-24, 35-44, 45-54,
55-64, 65-74, 75 and older.
 Gender: Respondents are recorded as Male or Female. In 2016, an additional
category for “Other” was added. These observations are omitted.
 State: State of current residence.
 Race: Respondents are coded as White, Black, Asian or Pacific Islander, Amer-
ican Indian or Alaska Native, Hispanic, or Other or Multiracial. Prior to 1966,
the only available categories were White, Black, or Other.
 Religion: respondents’ religion is coded as Mainline Protestant, Evangelical
Protestant, Black Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Non-traditional Orthodox, Non-
Christian/Non-Jewish, or Atheist / Agnostic / None. In cases where this was
not specified but a finer level of religion was specified (i.e., “United Methodist
Church”), the appropriate coarser classification for religion was imputed.
 Church attendance: Respondents were classified as have No Religious Preference
or attending church Never, Seldom, Often, or Regularly.
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 Education: Respondents were categorized as No High School, Some High School,
Some College, or College or Advanced Degree.
 Marital Status: respondents’ marital status is Married, Never Married, Di-
vorced, Separated, Widowed, or Living with a Non-Spousal Partner.
 Income: Respondents were asked about their total household pre-tax income
and then classified as being in the 0-16th income percentile, in the 17th to 33rd
percentile, 34th to 67th percentile, 68th to 95th percentile, or 96th to 100th
percentile.
 Employment Status: Respondents were classified as Employed, Retired, Home-
maker, Student, or Otherwise Not Employed.
 Union membership: Respondents were asked whether they or someone else in
the household belonged to a labor union.
 Parental nativity. Respondents’ own nativity is not available for more recent
cohorts. Among those waves prior to 1994, approximately 4.6% of respondents
were foreign born.
We would like to add measures of urbanicity to these variables; however, urbanicity
is not publicly available for ANES cohorts after 1998 due to privacy concerns. We
are in the process of applying for restricted-access data from ANES that would allow
us to see respondents’ urbanicity and county of residence.
While most of the above variables are available in every cohort except 1948 and
1954, there are some exceptions.
 In 1952, all answers to the question about marital status except “married”
were classified together. This may include respondents for whom marital status
could not be determined. As it is exceedingly rare in the following cohorts
that this answer is not available for a survey respondent, we choose to treat all
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observations as unmarried.
 Income status is unavailable for respondents in 1998. We omit this variable
from the model in that year.
 Work status is unavailable in 1962 and 1966. We omit this variable from the
model in that year.
 Parental nativity is not available for several non-presidential survey waves (1958,
1962, 1996, 1998, and 2002). We omit this variable in those years.
We have confirmed that omitting these variables in all years leads to qualitatively
similar patterns.
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B.2 Raw Accuracy Results
For the reasons detailed in Section 2.2.3, we believe that the appropriate summary
measure for the predictive power of our model is the AUC of the ROC curve rather
than the binary classification accuracy rate. However, we present below the model’s
binary classification accuracy rate for each of our outcome measures. We note that
two trends are observable in these results: an increase in in the classification rates
from 2008 onward relative to the preceding years, and major shifts between cohorts
in the baseline rate given by the most common class for each variable. Thus, it is
difficult to confidently draw conclusions using this measure.
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B.3 Alternative Methodologies
As seen below, the results shown in Figure 2 are qualitatively similar if we use a logit
model, extreme gradient boosting, or an elastic net in place of random forests for
our prediction framework. Random forests tends to perform approximately as well or
better than these alternatives in terms of the model AUC produced in most cohorts,
and thus are our preferred measure.
B.4 Supplementary Figures
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Supplementary Material for Chapter 3
C.1 Data Appendix
In this appendix, we detail the data and specifications discussed in Sections 3.2 and
3.3.
C.1.1 NJDOE and NPS Student Information
We acquired administrative data for students attending traditional public and charter
schools in Newark from 2011-2012 through 2017-2018. These were used for test scores
(see Section C.1.2) and the following information about each student and as of the
year following their Newark Enrolls participation:
 School attended.
 Date of birth.
 Gender.
 Race. Students are marked as American Indian, Asian, Black, Pacific Islander,
or White. These categories are not strictly mutually exclusive.
 Ethnicity. Students are marked as Hispanic or non-Hispanic.
 Limited English Proficiency status. Students were considered to have LEP
status if they have ever been in an LEP program.
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 Special education status. Students with a code of “X”,“00”, or “99” were as-
sumed to be non-special education students. All other codes were assumed
indicate that a student had special education status.
 Free and reduced lunch status.
These files sometimes contain multiple records per student; this could happen if
the student changed schools. We filtered the data to a single record per student per
year, under the assumption that the most accurate record for any student was the
school with the most recent school entry date.
We supplemented these controls with the following information from the Newark
Enrolls data files:
 Grade applied for.
 IEP status at time of Newark Enrolls participation.
 Free lunch status at time of Newark Enrolls participation.
 Geographic neighborhood at time of Newark Enrolls participation.
C.1.2 Student Test Scores
In columns 7 and 8 of Table 5, we used test scores in mathematics and language
arts literacy (LAL) in the year of Newark Enrolls participation as a baseline control.
In 2013-2014, the relevant test scores were students’ New Jersey ASK Mathematics
Scaled Scores and New Jersey ASK LAL Scaled Scores. For later years, New Jer-
sey began using PARCC exams. For these years, we used the New Jersey PARCC
Mathematics, Algebra I, Algebra II, Geometry, and LAL Scaled Scores.
Test scores were standardized to have a mean value of 0 and standard deviation
of 1 within each grade, subject and year, with the exception of Algebra I, Algebra
II, and Geometry scores. In the case of these scores, they were standardized within
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subject and year but across all grades.
C.1.3 Charter Schools and Magnet High Schools
For each student in each year, we obtained the school most recently entered according
to the NJDOE data. This was used to mark charter school attendance status in the
year following Newark Enrolls participation. For analyses 2 or 3 years following
Newark Enrolls participation, the relevant treatment variable was still assumed to be
attendance in the year following participation.
Table C.1 includes all Newark charter schools, and their participation status in
Newark Enrolls in 2014 and 2015.
Newark Public Schools operates six magnet high schools that all use the Newark
Enrolls system. None of the six are charter schools. These schools are permitted to
use additional criteria to rank students in the Newark Enrolls process, including stan-
dardized test scores, attendance records, course grades, interviews, writing samples,
and auditions. They are listed in Table C.2.
C.1.4 Newark Enrolls School Assignments, Student Lottery Simulation,
and Propensity Score Calculation
The following procedure was applied for 2014 and 2015 Newark Enrolls participants:
Student School Assignments For both cohorts, I only consider students who
participated in the initial round of Newark Enrolls for the reasons detailed in Section
3. For students in the 2014 cohorts, I directly observe their first round assignment.
For students in the 2015 cohort, I only have their final assignment after all rounds.
Thus, this 2015 variable is noisy, and may not accurately represent the first round as-
signment if the student chooses to reenter in the second round and receives a different
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assignment.
Student School Preferences and Guaranteed Schools: Students’ choices were
rearranged to remove any blank spots in their ordering between their first and last
choice. This could occur if a student’s submission included a school for which that
student was not eligible. For example, if a first grade applicant submitted a listing
of Park Elementary School, Malcolm X. Shabazz High School, and Hawkins Street
Elementary School, they would be treated as if Hawkins Street Elementary School
was their second choice school. Students could list up to eight schools, but were not
required to list multiple schools.
If applicable, students were assigned a guaranteed school. Should a student receive
a seat at none of the schools on their list, their current school was assumed to be
guaranteed unless they were marked as being in a transition grade for their school
(i.e., a sixth grade applicant currently attending a school offering grades K through
5) or their school was closing.
Seat Allocations The number of seats available for each grade-school combination
was not available. We estimated this for every grade-school combination for which we
observed an assigned student. For a given grade-school combination, the number of
seats available was assumed to be the greater of students assigned to that school in the
first round or after both rounds, less any seats that appeared to have been allocated as
a result of being a student’s guaranteed school. Assignments were assumed to be the
result of guaranteed school status when students were matched back to their current
school. Students from the geographic neighborhood of each school were assumed
to have priority for 75% of available seats as described below, with the exception
of students applying to high schools, multi-campus charters, or Philip’s Academy
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Charter School.1
Propensity Score Calculation Newark Enrolls assigns students to schools based
on students’ preferred list of schools, the number of seats available, a priority system,
and a randomly generated lottery number. To generate the likelihood that a par-
ticular student would be assigned to a charter school holding constant all students’
preferences, we simulated this process 500 times with new randomly generated lottery
numbers.
For each simulated round of this process, the following algorithm was completed
after generating new lottery numbers distributed uniformly between 0 and 1, with
lower numbers granting higher probability of admission:
1. Assign all students to a school. For the first iteration, use the first choice school
for all students. For all later iterations, use the same school as the previous
iteration if they were temporarily assigned admission; otherwise use the next
school on the student’s list.
2. Assign all students two priority numbers.
(a) Students’ non-geographic priority number is their lottery number plus 0
if their current school is closing, 1 if they have a sibling at their applied
school, and 2 otherwise.
(b) Students’ geographic priority number is their lottery number plus 0 if their
current school is closing, 1 if they have a sibling at their applied school,
2 if they reside in the same neighborhood as their applied school, and 3
otherwise.
1Based on discussions with NPS employees familiar with the process, Philip’s Academy Charter
School was unable to apply geographic preferences due to rules regarding funding received from the
federal government.
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3. For magnet schools, assign temporary admission if they were eventually assigned
to their applied school and 0 otherwise.
4. For non-magnet schools, rank all students by geographic priority number at
each grade-school combination, with the lowest number assigned a rank of 1.
Assign temporary admission if their numerical rank is less than 75% of available
seats for that grade-school combination.
5. For students applying to non-magnet schools and not assigned admission in
the previous step, re-rank them within each grade-school combination by non-
geographic priority number, and assign temporary admission if their numerical
rank is less than 25% of available seats for that grade-school combination.
6. Repeat this process until all students have been assigned to a school or have
exhausted all schools on their list without being assigned a seat.
7. For students still unassigned at the end of this process, assign them to their
guaranteed school if applicable. Otherwise, classify them as unassigned.
At the end of this process, there are three possible outcomes for each student: they
are assigned to a school on their list, they are assigned to their guaranteed school, or
they are unassigned.
For each student, their charter school propensity score was calculated as the pro-
portion of instances where their assigned school was one of the participating charter
schools in Table C.1. For example, if a student was assigned to a charter school in
200 of the 500 simulations, their charter propensity score would be 0.4.
C.1.5 Data Merge
All students who participated in the first round of Newark Enrolls received a charter
school propensity score. These scores (and control variables found in the Newark
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Enrolls data) were merged to NJDOE administrative records for the year of and the
year following assignment using students’ Statewide Student Identifier (SID) numbers.
21.65% and 18.28% of students in the 2014 and 2015 Newark Enrolls data respectively
are missing an SID code. 14.3% and 16.9% of students in the 2014 and 2015 Newark
Enrolls data have an SID code, but cannot be matched to records in one or both
NJDOE files.
C.1.6 Regression Samples
To be included in our regression sample for n years after assignment, a student must
have participated in that year’s Newark Enrolls first round assignments and successful
merge to NJDOE records by SID number in the pre-assignment year and the first post
assignment year (the “treatment” year).
All regressions, unless noted otherwise, contain the following control variables:
 Charter school propensity score.
 An indicator for whether they were previously attending a participating charter
school.
 An indicator for whether they were previously attending a non-participating
charter school.
 An indicator for whether they were previously attending a magnet school.
 Grade applied for.
 An indicator for having been in a transition grade at the time of Newark Enrolls.
 An indicator for having been enrolled at the time of Newark Enrolls in in a
school scheduled to close.
 A set of indicators for student race.
 Gender.
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 Date of birth.
 Neighborhood at the time of Newark Enrolls assignment.
 IEP status as recorded by Newark Enrolls.
 Special education status as recorded by NJDOE at the time of assignment.
 Free lunch status as recorded by Newark Enrolls.
 Free and reduced lunch status as recorded by NJDOE at the time of assignment.
 LEP status as recorded by NJDOE at the time of assignment.
 Newark Enrolls cohort indicator.
Additionally, they include indicators for whether the student had been subject to
a structural move in each year, where a structural move is one caused by reaching
the final grade in a school or school closure.
For the regressions controlling for student preferences, we include a categorical
variable for the rank of the student’s assigned school in their rankings, and separate
flags for students who did not obtain a match at a ranked school and for students
matched back to their prior school.
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Table C.1: Newark Charter Schools
2014-2015 2014-2015 NJDOE
Newark Enrolls Newark Enrolls District &
School Participant? School Code School Code
Great Oaks Charter School1 Yes 711 6053-917
Lady Liberty Academy Charter School Yes 713 7100-936
Marion P. Thomas Charter School Yes 715 7210-940
Merit Prep Charter School2 Yes 716 6091-974
Newark Educators’ Community Charter School Yes 718 6029-911
Newark Legacy Charter School1 Yes 719 6037-922
Newark Prep Charter School2 Yes 720 6059-941
North Star Academy Charter School (Uncommon) Yes 721 7320-960
People’s Preparatory Charter School Yes 722 6057-938
Philip’s Academy Charter School Yes 723 6094-968
Roseville Community Charter School Yes 725 6058-939
TEAM Charter Schools (KIPP) Yes 726 7325-965
The Paulo Freire Charter School2 Yes 728 6090-977
University Heights Charter School Yes 729 8065-980
Vision Academy Charter School3 Yes 730 6038-923
Achieve Community Charter School4 No N/A 6110-902
Discovery Charter School No N/A 6320-920
LEAD Charter School 4 No N/A 6109-953
Link Community Charter School No N/A 6099-986
Maria L. Varisco-Rogers Charter School No N/A 7735-975
M.E.T.S. Charter School5 No N/A 6068-951
New Horizons Community Charter School5 No N/A 7290-957
Robert Treat Academy Charter School No N/A 7730-970
The Gray Charter School No N/A 6665-930
1 Great Oaks Charter School and Newark Legacy Charter School merged in 2016 and became known as
Great Oaks Legacy Charter School, with Newark Enrolls School Code 731.
2 Merit Prep Charter School, Newark Prep Charter School, and the Paulo Freire Charter School were
ordered to close in 2017 by NJDOE due to poor performance, and did not participate in Newark Enrolls
from 2017 onward.
3 Vision Academy Charter was subsumed by Marion P. Thomas Charter School after the 2013-2014
school year and did not appear in later cohorts of Newark Enrolls.
4 Achieve Community Charter School and LEAD Charter School opened in 2017. Achieve Community
Charter School participated in the 2017 cohort of Newark Enrolls with the Newark Enrolls School Code
732; LEAD charter school remains a non-participating charter school.
5 M.E.T.S. Charter School and New Horizons Community Charter School became participating schools
in the 2017 cohort of Newark Enrolls with the Newark Enrolls School Codes of 733 and 717.
C.2 Supplementary Tables
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Table C.2: Newark Magnet High Schools
2014-2015 Newark NJDOE District &
School Enrolls School Code School Code
American History High School 43 3570-087
Arts High School1 26 3570-010
Bard Early College High School 11 3570-304
University High School 24 3570-057
Science Park High School 25 3570-055
Technology High School 38 3570-056
1 Arts High School includes several different programs. Prior to 2017, the
Newark Enrolls data marks each of these separately (i.e., 26TR for students
wishing to study in the trumpet program).
Table C.3: 2014 Covariate Balance With and Without Charter Propensity Score
Variable Non-Offer Mean Offer Mean No Prop. Coef. No Prop. p-val Prop. Coef. Prop. p-val
Female 0.51 0.52 0.01 0.62 0.00 0.95
Black 0.76 0.79 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.53
Hispanic 0.23 0.19 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.60
Free Lunch 0.68 0.53 -0.15 0.00 -0.04 0.14
Red. Price Lunch 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.16
Prev. Spec. Ed. 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.68 0.02 0.09
LEP 0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.58
F-stat 10.67 0.00 1.53 0.15
In each row, the second and third columns report the unconditional mean of an indicator variable for the student charac-
teristic listed in the first column for students in the sample who were or were not offered a seat at a participating charter
school via the first round of the 2014 or 2015 Newark Enrolls process. The fourth and fifth column report the coefficient on
charter assignment in a regression of charter assignment on the relevant demographic indicator, while the sixth and seventh
column report the same coefficient for a regression that includes the charter propensity score described in Section 3.2. The
final row reports the result of an F-test for joint significance of all the variables in the first column.
Table C.4: 2015 Covariate Balance With and Without Charter Propensity Score
Variable Non-Offer Mean Offer Mean No Prop. Coef. No Prop. p-val Prop. Coef. Prop. p-val
Female 0.50 0.49 -0.02 0.54 -0.05 0.19
Black 0.77 0.76 -0.01 0.78 -0.00 0.94
Hispanic 0.22 0.22 0.01 0.81 0.01 0.78
Free Lunch 0.68 0.54 -0.14 0.00 0.02 0.62
Red. Price Lunch 0.05 0.04 -0.00 0.68 -0.00 0.71
Prev. Spec. Ed. 0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.15 0.02 0.21
LEP 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.88 0.01 0.56
F-stat 3.95 0.00 0.58 0.70
In each row, the second and third columns report the unconditional mean of an indicator variable for the student charac-
teristic listed in the first column for students in the sample who were or were not offered a seat at a participating charter
school via the first round of the 2014 or 2015 Newark Enrolls process. The fourth and fifth column report the coefficient on
charter assignment in a regression of charter assignment on the relevant demographic indicator, while the sixth and seventh
column report the same coefficient for a regression that includes the charter propensity score described in Section 3.2. The
final row reports the result of an F-test for joint significance of all the variables in the first column.
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Table C.5: Effect of Charter Attendance for 2014 Lottery Cohort
Dependent Variable
Any Mobility or Reentry
1yr 2yr 3yr 1yr 2yr 3yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Participating Charter School −0.167∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.055∗ −0.072∗∗ −0.043
(0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034)
Charter Propensity 0.112∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.009 0.023 0.003
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Non Participating Charter School 0.053 0.028 0.002 0.075∗ 0.054 0.031
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042)
Rank 2 Match 0.060∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
Rank 3 Match 0.129∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022)
Rank 4 Match 0.153∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
Rank 5 Match 0.080∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.039) (0.037)
Rank 6 Match 0.193∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
Rank 7 Match 0.154∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.057) (0.055)
Rank 8 Match 0.231∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.065) (0.056)
No Ranked Match 0.131∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Matched Backed 0.057∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Rank Controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Grades All All All All All All
Cohort 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014
Observations 7,099 7,099 7,099 7,099 7,099 7,099
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.147 0.157 0.161 0.162 0.171
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: All regressions include controls for students’ genders, free or reduced lunch status, date of birth, special
education status, LEP status, race, ethnicity, neighborhood of resident, grade, non-participating charter attendance,
and whether the students were previous charter attendees or required to move due to school closures or reaching a
terminal grade. The outcome variable is an cumulative indicator for whether the student made an intra-NPS move,
exited NPS schools, or reentered the Newark Enrolls after the initial post-assignment year. Charter propensity is
calculated as described in Section 3.2.
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Table C.6: Effect of Charter Attendence for 2015 Lottery Cohort
Dependent Variable
Any Mobility or Reentry
1yr 2yr 1yr 2yr
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Participating Charter School −0.224∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041)
Charter Propensity 0.157∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.042 0.063∗
(0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035)
Non Participating Charter School −0.016 0.001 −0.003 0.013
(0.038) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041)
Rank 2 Match 0.082∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017)
Rank 3 Match 0.143∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024)
Rank 4 Match 0.106∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.033)
Rank 5 Match 0.254∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.047)
Rank 6 Match 0.058 0.137∗
(0.065) (0.070)
Rank 7 Match 0.059 0.116
(0.070) (0.082)
Rank 8 Match 0.318∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗
(0.108) (0.099)
No Ranked Match 0.165∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Matched Backed 0.063∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Rank Controls? No No Yes Yes
Grades All All All All
Cohort 2015 2015 2015 2015
Observations 6,773 6,773 6,773 6,773
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.130 0.133 0.152
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: All regressions include controls for students’ gender, free or reduced lunch status,
date of birth, special education status, LEP status, race, ethnicity, neighborhood of resident,
grade, non-participating charter attendance, and whether the students were previous charter
attendees or required to move due to school closures or reaching a terminal grade. The
outcome variable is an cumulative indicator for whether the student made an intra-NPS
move, exited NPS schools, or reentered the Newark Enrolls after the initial post-assignment
year. Charter propensity is calculated as described in Section 3.2.
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Table C.7: Effect of Charter Attendance for 2014-2015 Lottery Cohorts: Any Intra-
NPS Move or Exit NPS
Dependent Variable
Any Intra-NPS Move or Exit NPS
1yr 2yr 3yr 1yr 2yr 3yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Participating Charter School −0.142∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.041
(0.023) (0.026) (0.035) (0.023) (0.026) (0.034)
Charter Propensity 0.082∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.006 0.036 −0.011
(0.021) (0.023) (0.030) (0.021) (0.023) (0.030)
Non Participating Charter School −0.017 −0.013 0.0002 −0.005 0.007 0.026
(0.025) (0.028) (0.041) (0.024) (0.028) (0.041)
Rank 2 Match 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.020
(0.010) (0.012) (0.017)
Rank 3 Match 0.109∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.022)
Rank 4 Match 0.105∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.029)
Rank 5 Match 0.119∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.038)
Rank 6 Match 0.120∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.038) (0.045)
Rank 7 Match 0.089∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.046) (0.056)
Rank 8 Match 0.171∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.057) (0.061)
No Ranked Match 0.100∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.017)
Matched Backed 0.038∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.020)
Rank Controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Grades All All All All All All
Cohort 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014
Observations 13,872 13,872 7,099 13,872 13,872 7,099
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.146 0.162 0.150 0.158 0.174
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: All regressions include controls for students’ gender, free or reduced lunch status, date of birth, special education
status, LEP status, race, ethnicity, neighborhood of resident, grade, Newark Enrolls cohort, non-participating charter
attendance, and whether the students were previous charter attendees or required to move due to school closures or
reaching a terminal grade. The outcome variable is an cumulative indicator for whether the student made an intra-NPS
move or exited NPS schools after the initial post-assignment year. Charter propensity is calculated as described in Section
3.2.
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Table C.8: Effect of Charter Attendance for 2014-2015 Lottery Cohorts: Non-
Structural Intra-NPS Move or Exit NPS
Dependent Variable
Non-Structural Intra-NPS Move or Exit NPS
1yr 2yr 3yr 1yr 2yr 3yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Participating Charter School −0.142∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.045
(0.023) (0.027) (0.036) (0.023) (0.027) (0.036)
Charter Propensity 0.082∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.006 0.031 −0.023
(0.021) (0.024) (0.032) (0.021) (0.024) (0.032)
Non Participating Charter School −0.017 −0.010 0.002 −0.005 0.009 0.025
(0.025) (0.029) (0.043) (0.024) (0.029) (0.043)
Rank 2 Match 0.054∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.032∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.018)
Rank 3 Match 0.109∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.023)
Rank 4 Match 0.105∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.030)
Rank 5 Match 0.119∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.040)
Rank 6 Match 0.120∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.039) (0.047)
Rank 7 Match 0.089∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.047) (0.058)
Rank 8 Match 0.171∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.059) (0.066)
No Ranked Match 0.100∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.018)
Matched Backed 0.038∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.021)
Rank Controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Grades All All All All All All
Cohort 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014
Observations 13,872 13,872 7,099 13,872 13,872 7,099
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.049 0.056 0.054 0.061 0.068
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: All regressions include controls for students’ gender, free or reduced lunch status, date of birth, special education
status, LEP status, race, ethnicity, neighborhood of resident, grade, Newark Enrolls cohort, non-participating charter
attendance, and whether the students were previous charter attendees or required to move due to school closures or
reaching a terminal grade. The outcome variable is an cumulative indicator for whether the student made an intra-NPS
move or exited NPS schools after the initial post-assignment year where the mobility was not due to structural reasons
- meaning school closure or having reached the terminal grade for the students’ current schools. Charter propensity is
calculated as described in Section 3.2.
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1yr 2yr 3yr 1yr 2yr 3yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Participating Charter School −0.138∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.023) (0.033) (0.020) (0.023) (0.033)
Charter Propensity 0.079∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.023 0.034∗ 0.022
(0.018) (0.021) (0.030) (0.018) (0.021) (0.030)
Non Participating Charter School −0.007 −0.015 −0.027 0.004 0.001 −0.006
(0.022) (0.027) (0.038) (0.022) (0.026) (0.038)
Rank 2 Match 0.044∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
Rank 3 Match 0.068∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.021)
Rank 4 Match 0.058∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.019) (0.027)
Rank 5 Match 0.075∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.026) (0.037)
Rank 6 Match 0.095∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.035) (0.044)
Rank 7 Match 0.043 0.037 0.092
(0.031) (0.039) (0.056)
Rank 8 Match 0.127∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.057) (0.069)
No Ranked Match 0.072∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.016)
Matched Backed 0.037∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.020)
Rank Controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Grades All All All All All All
Cohort 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014
Observations 13,872 13,872 7,099 13,872 13,872 7,099
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.159 0.192 0.146 0.170 0.203
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: All regressions include controls for students’ gender, free or reduced lunch status, date of birth, special education
status, LEP status, race, ethnicity, neighborhood of resident, grade, Newark Enrolls cohort, non-participating charter
attendance, and whether the students were previous charter attendees or required to move due to school closures or
reaching a terminal grade. The outcome variable is an cumulative indicator for whether the student made an intra-NPS
move after the initial post-assignment year. Charter propensity is calculated as described in Section 3.2.
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Table C.10: Effect of Charter Attendance for 2014-2015 Lottery Cohorts: NPS Exit
Dependent Variable
NPS Exit
1yr 2yr 3yr 1yr 2yr 3yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Participating Charter School −0.004 −0.016 0.009 0.017 0.005 0.028
(0.016) (0.019) (0.026) (0.016) (0.019) (0.026)
Charter Propensity 0.003 0.047∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.017 0.026 −0.021
(0.014) (0.016) (0.023) (0.014) (0.017) (0.024)
Non Participating Charter School −0.010 −0.006 0.043 −0.009 −0.004 0.046
(0.016) (0.020) (0.031) (0.016) (0.020) (0.031)
Rank 2 Match 0.010 0.005 −0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Rank 3 Match 0.041∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.019)
Rank 4 Match 0.047∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.024)
Rank 5 Match 0.044∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.058∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.032)
Rank 6 Match 0.025 0.041 −0.025
(0.025) (0.028) (0.031)
Rank 7 Match 0.046 0.077∗∗ 0.065
(0.033) (0.037) (0.048)
Rank 8 Match 0.045 0.038 0.030
(0.040) (0.043) (0.056)
No Ranked Match 0.028∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.025∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013)
Matched Backed 0.001 0.009 0.002
(0.010) (0.011) (0.017)
Rank Controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Grades All All All All All All
Cohort 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014
Observations 13,872 13,872 7,099 13,872 13,872 7,099
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.024 0.025
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: All regressions include controls for students’ gender, free or reduced lunch status, date of birth, special education
status, LEP status, race, ethnicity, neighborhood of resident, grade, Newark Enrolls cohort, non-participating charter
attendance, and whether the students were previous charter attendees or required to move due to school closures
or reaching a terminal grade. The outcome variable is an cumulative indicator for whether the student exited NPS
schools after the initial post-assignment year. Charter propensity is calculated as described in Section 3.2.
133




1yr 2yr 3yr 1yr 2yr 3yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Participating Charter School −0.165∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023) (0.032) (0.020) (0.022) (0.031)
Charter Propensity 0.129∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.024 0.034∗ 0.051∗
(0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028)
Non Participating Charter School 0.030 0.021 −0.028 0.054∗∗ 0.046∗ 0.005
(0.024) (0.026) (0.040) (0.024) (0.026) (0.040)
Rank 2 Match 0.069∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
Rank 3 Match 0.101∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019)
Rank 4 Match 0.102∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.025)
Rank 5 Match 0.103∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.029)
Rank 6 Match 0.140∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.033) (0.039)
Rank 7 Match 0.095∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.037) (0.048)
Rank 8 Match 0.217∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.057) (0.064)
No Ranked Match 0.136∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Matched Backed 0.083∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019)
Rank Controls? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Grades All All All All All All
Cohort 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014 2014-2015 2014-2015 2014
Observations 13,872 13,872 7,099 13,872 13,872 7,099
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.243 0.302 0.217 0.269 0.322
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: All regressions include controls for students’ gender, free or reduced lunch status, date of birth, special education
status, LEP status, race, ethnicity, neighborhood of resident, grade, Newark Enrolls cohort, non-participating charter
attendance, and whether the students were previous charter attendees or required to move due to school closures or
reaching a terminal grade. The outcome variable is an cumulative indicator for whether the student reentered the Newark
Enrolls lottery after the initial post-assignment year. Charter propensity is calculated as described in Section 3.2.
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